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Real Property and Peoplehood
Kristen A. Carpenter*
This Article proposes a theory of "real property and peoplehood" in
which lands essential to the identity and survival of collective groups are
entitled to heightened legal protection. Although many Americans are
sympathetic to American Indian tribes and their quest for cultural survival,
we remain unwilling to confront the uncomfortable truth that the very thing
Indian peoples need is their land, the same land that the United States took
from them. This is especially true with regard to Indian "sacred sites."
These are features of the natural landscape holding religious and cultural
significance for American Indian tribes. The Supreme Court has held that
destruction of sacred sites located on the public lands does not impinge on
individual religious belief and falls within the government's powers as a
landowner. This is true even if the sacred site is unique and essential to a
particular religious practice. Although recent federal policy has evolved in
favor of accommodating Indian sacred sites practices, land management
agencies use their considerable discretion to permit competing uses of the
public lands-such as natural resource development and tourism-that
threaten the physical integrity of sacred sites. Such decisions devastate
Indian people and undermine our shared expectation of free exercise rights
for all Americans. Thus, federal law needs to prioritize Indian interests in
sacred sites over competing uses of the public lands. Unfortunately, we do
not yet have a legal theory justifying such a position.
My theory of real property and peoplehood furthers the work of scholars
who have recognized the relationship between human beings and property,
albeit in other contexts. Most influentially, Professor Margaret Jane Radin
* Assistant Professor, University of Denver, College of Law; J.D., Harvard Law School
(1998); A.B., Dartmouth College (1994). With many thanks to Bob Chang, Erik Bluemel,
Fred Cheever, Matthew Fletcher, Phil Frickey, Lorie Graham, Sonia Katyal, Martin Nie,
Angela Riley, Joe Singer, Gerald Torres, Eli Wald, Rob Williams, and Thatcher Wine for
their comments and many forms of encouragement. This Article is for Usdi Echota and
the sacred places in all of us.
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has long argued for special legal protection of property that expresses an
individual's sense of self and therefore cannot be translated into a monetary
value. But whereas Radin focuses on property that expresses individual
personhood, I am interested in property that expresses collective
"peoplehood." As a descriptive matter, this concept of peoplehood reflects
that, even in the United States where the individual rights paradigm
dominates, individuals affiliate themselves along sub-national political,
religious, ethnic, and cultural lines and their exercise of fundamental
liberties occurs in those contexts. As a normative concept, John Rawls has
argued that as a matter of "reasonable pluralism, " liberal states like the
United States should recognize peoples and treat them fairly. To do
otherwise is to fall short of our best democratic principles, such as the idea
that all Americans are entitled to religious freedom. Working at the
confluence of Radin and Rawls, the Article argues that Indian tribes are
peoples whose legitimate interests in sacred sites deserve special legal
protection as a testament to American liberty for both individuals and
groups.
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I. INTRODUCTION
When this place is destroyed, the Cherokee people cease to exist as a
people.'
As Americans, our national identity is shaped by the guarantee
of individual liberties. To be American is to have the right to
speak, worship and vote freely. To be American is to be treated
equally before the law, irrespective of race, creed, or national
origin. To be American is to enjoy private property. These and
other quintessentially American freedoms are legally protected as
individual rights.2 Aside from the Constitution's provisions on
association and non-discrimination, we lack a robust set of legal
protections for group rights.' Indeed, a defining characteristic of
American "peoplehood"4  seems to be the belief that our
fundamental freedoms and democratic ideals can be meaningfully
1. BRIAN EDWARD BROWN, RELIGION, LAW, AND THE LAND: NATIVE AMERICANS AND
THE JUDICIAL INTERPRETATION OF SACRED LAND 15 (1999) (quoting Cherokee
traditionalists in sacred site lawsuit).
2. SeeJohn Paul Stevens, The Bill of Rights: A Century of Progress, 59 U. CHI. L. REV. 13,
22 (1992). Our American identity is also shaped, and tested, by instances where our
country fails to afford such individual freedoms. See, e.g., Mark D. Rotenberg, America's
Ambiguous Exceptionalism, 3 U. ST. THOMAS L.J. 188, 195 (2005); see also Michael Fisher,
Book Note, The President of Good and Evil: The Ethics of George W Bush by Peter Singer Dutton,
51 FED. LAW., Mar.-Apr. 2004, at 48, 49 (criticizing suspension of'individual rights during
the "war on terror").
3. See generally AVLAM SOIFER, LAW AND THE COMPANY WE KEEP (1995) (surveying
existing basis for group rights in U.S. law and calling for additional legal protection of
groups); cf Robert M. Cover, The Origins ofJudicial Activism in the Protection of Minorities, 91
YALE L.J. 1287 (1982) (describing the emergence of constitutionally-based jurisprudence
protecting ethnic, national, and racial minorities).
4. Cf David C. Williams, The Militia Movement and the Second Amendment: Conjuring
with the People, 81 CORNELL L. REV. 879, 884 (1996) (describing one view in which "the
principal component of American peoplehood" is "loyalty to the Constitution"). For
definitions of the terms "peoples" and "peoplehood" see infra notes 212-215, 223-225 and
accompanying text.
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effectuated through the legal protection of individual rights.5
In practice, however, many Americans affiliate themselves in
political, ethnic, religious, or cultural groups, and exercise their
fundamental liberties in those contexts.' Indeed, for some
Americans, the group serves as even more than a context for the
exercise of individual liberties. Rather, it is the group's survival
that gives individual lives purpose and meaning.7 Without legal
protection for the group and its special needs within the larger
society, some Americans only aspire to enjoy the freedoms that
others take for granted.8
Many American Indians are, for example, intimately connected
to the land, perhaps to a greater degree than are many other
Americans.9 This relationship with the land reflects the collective
values of many tribal communities. At the most basic level, the land
sustains subsistence hunting, fishing and gathering, on which some
tribal people depend for their daily food." Though individual
hunters go out on the land, they often do so on behalf of their
family, clan, or the entire tribe-consistent with tribal rules and
expectations." The land also gives rise to the origin stories, societal
5. Cf Left Volpp, The Culture of Citizenship, 8 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES L. 571, 600
(2007) (critically examining the notion of "tolerance" for minority communities as an
attribute of American peoplehood); James U. Blacksher, Majority Black Districts, Kiryas Joel,
and Other Challenges to American Nationalism, 26 CUMB. L. REV. 407, 440-41 (2005) (arguing
that reformers tend to address minority rights through an integrationist approach rather
than extension of political recognition to ethnic or religious communities).
6. See, e.g., JOHN-MICHAEL RIVERA, THE EMERGENCE OF MEXICAN AMERICA:
RECOVERING STORIES OF MEXICAN PEOPLEHOOD IN U.S. CULTURE (2006); NABEEL
ABRAHAM AND ANDREW SHRYOCK, ARAB DETROIT: FROM MARGIN TO MAINSTREAM (2006);
RICHARD K. MACMASTER, LAND, PIETY, PEOPLEHOOD: THE ESTABLISHMENT OF MENNONITE
COMMUNITIES IN AMERICA, 1683-1790 (1985); LEE SHAI WEISSBACH, JEWISH LIFE IN SMALL
TOWN AMERICA (2005).
7. See, e.g., Angela R. Riley, Recovering Collectivity: Group Rights to Intellectual Property in
Indigenous Communities, 18 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. LJ. 175, 203-04 (2000).
8. See, e.g., Angela R. Riley, (Tribal) Sovereignty and Illiberalism, 95 CAL. L. REV. 799,
831-35 (2007) (arguing that American Indians' culture, commerce, and governance
depend on tribes' legally-protected status as "illiberal" entities within American society).
9. See generally KEITH H. BASSO, WISDOM SITS IN PLACES: LANDSCAPE AND LANGUAGE
AMONG THE WESTERN APACHE (1996) (detailing varied roles of "place" in Western Apache
life).
10. See, e.g., RICK BASS, CARIBOU RISING: DEFENDING THE PORCUPINE HERD, GWICH-
'IN CULTURE, AND THE ARCTIC NATIONAL WILDLIFE REFUGE (2004) (portraying Neet'sai
Gwich'in dependence on caribou hunting).
11. See, e.g., N. LLEWELLYN & E. ADAMSON HOEBEL, THE CHEYENNE WAY 9-12 (1941)
(analyzing the case of a Cheyenne man who declared, "I am hunting for myself," thereby
breaking tribal rules against individual hunting."). For a contemporary example, see Makah
[Vol. 27:313
REAL PROPERTY AND PEOPLEHOOD
norms, governing patterns, and spiritual practices that bind
individuals together." For most tribes, it has been this way since
they came to view themselves as distinct peoples, that is, as Kiowas
or Cherokees, Navajos or Hopis.
3
Following European conquest and American colonization, the
relationship between tribes and the land has become only more
important, if difficult to maintain. Tribes lost most of their
traditional territories to the United States and its citizens. 4 With
those losses also went many tribal cultural and socio-economic
practices. 5 On the lands that tribes managed to keep, however,
they continue to live as distinct peoples-governing, worshipping,
supporting themselves, and relating to one another as tribal
members. 6
Many Americans today are sympathetic to American Indians
and their quest for cultural survival. 7 Yet, we lack a national
consensus that subgroups of Americans may require something
more than individual rights if they are to realize the national
promise of freedom. s And even if we try to develop such an
understanding, we confront the uncomfortable truth that the very
Nation delays trial for unauthorized hunt, INDIANZ.COM, January 21, 2008,
http://www.indianz.com/News/2008/006722.asp (discussing tribal proceedings against
five individuals charged with illegal whale hunt).
12. See Padraic I. McCoy, The Land Must Hold the People: Native Modes of Territoriality
and Contemporary Tribal Justifications for Placing Land into Trust Through 25 C.F.R Part 21, 27
AM. INDIAN L. REV. 421, 424-45 (2002-2003).
13. See Swimmer & John Ax, How the World Was Made, in JAMES MOONEY, HISTORY,
MYTHS AND SACRED FORMULAS OF THE CHEROKEE 239 (1992) (describing a traditional
Cherokee creation story); N. SCOTr MOMADAY, THE WAY TO RAINY MOUNTAIN (1969)
(describing Kiowa origins and relationship with their landscape).
14. See generally STUART BANNER, HOW THE INDIANS LOST THEIR LAND: LAW AND
POWER ON THE FRONTIER (2005) (explaining how by 1887 Indians had lost 98 percent of
the land they held before Europeans arrived); Judith V. Royster, The Legacy of Allotment, 27
ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1, 13 & n.59 (1995) (describing the loss of another ninety million acres of
Indian nation land from 1887 to 1934).
15. See Kristen A. Carpenter, Contextualizing the Losses of Allotment Though Literature, 82
N.D. L. REV. 605, 622-23 (2006) (detailing cultural and socio-economic practices lost as a
result of the federal "allotment" of tribal lands).
16. See McCoy, supra note 12, at 423.
17. John Doble & Andrew L. Yarrow, WALKING A MILE: A FIRST STEP TOWARD
MUTUAL UNDERSTANDING: A QUALITATIVE STUDY EXPLORING HOW INDIANS AND NON-
INDIANS THINK ABOUT EACH OTHER, A REPORT FROM PUBLIC AGENDA 24 (2007), available
at http://www.publicagenda.org/research/pdfs/walkingamile.pdf (non-Indian
participants in national study generally indicated they "want to . . . preserve Indian
culture").
18. See Soifer, supra note 3, at 1-6.
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thing Indian peoples need is their land, the same land that the
United States took from them. Perhaps unsurprisingly then, even
the body of "Federal Indian Law," which substantially departs from
the individual rights tradition to provide for "exceptional"
treatment of tribes, 9 often fails to protect the Indian land base. 21 It
is particularly unsuccessful in protecting Indian sacred sites
located outside of reservation lands.2 '
In this Article, I advance a framework for legal
acknowledgment and protection of the essential relationship
between Indian tribes and their lands. This framework is grounded
in scholarship recognizing the relationship between human beings
and property, albeit in other contexts. Most influentially, Professor
Margaret Jane Radin has long argued for special treatment of
property that expresses an individual's sense of self and therefore
cannot be translated into a monetary value. Beginning with her
paradigmatic description of one's attachment to an engagement
ring, Radin has since applied her "property and personhood"
framework to many contemporary issues such as alienability of the
human body, takings, criminal justice, and the regulation of
cyberspace.23 In these contexts, Radin argues that where property is
so bound up with an individual person that it becomes "non-
fungible," it should be protected, at least partially, from
19. See generally Philip P. Frickey, (Native) American Exceptionalism in Federal Public Law,
119 HARV. L. REv. 431 (2006).
20. See, e.g., Joseph William Singer, Sovereignty and Property, 86 NW. U. L. REv. 1, 40-51
(1991); ROBERT A. WILLIAMS, JR., THE AMERICAN INDIAN IN WESTERN LEGAL THOUGHT:
THE DISCOURSES OF CONQUEST 313-17 (1990).
21. See Lyng v. Nw. Indian Cemetery Protective Ass'n, 485 U.S. 439, 453 (1988)
(finding that the free exercise clause does not preclude the federal government from
destroying a sacred site located on public lands). See generally Jeri Beth K. Ezra, The Trust
Doctrine: A Source of Protection for Native American Sacred Sites, 38 CATH. U. L. REv. 705 (1989)
(describing unrealized potential of federal Indian trust doctrine to protect Indian sacred
sites).
22. See MargaretJane Radin, Property and Personhood, 34 STAN. L. REV. 957 (1982).
23. Radin has authored dozens of articles and several books exploring these themes.
This article relies primarily on MargaretJane Radin, Market-Inalienability, 100 HARV. L. REV.
1849 (1987); Margaret Jane Radin, The Liberal Conception of Property: Cross Currents in the
Jurisprudence of Takings, 88 COLUM. L. REv. 1667 (1988) [hereinafter Radin, The Liberal
Conception]; MARGARET JANE RADIN, REINTERPRETING PROPERTY (1993); MARGARET JANE
RADIN, CONTESTED COMMODITIES (1996); Margaret Jane Radin, Property Evolving in
Cyberspace, 15 J.L. & COM. 509 (1996); and Margaret Jane Radin, Contested Commodities, in
RETHINKING COMMODIFICATION: CASES AND READINGS IN LAW AND CULTURE (Martha M.
Ertman andJoan C. Williams, eds., 2005) [hereinafter Radin, Rethinking].
[Vol. 27:313
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government interference and market pressures.24 Even if other
important values are at stake, the law should regulate such
property to promote "human flourishing.
25
This Article takes Radin's work in a new direction, using it as a
basis for conceptualizing and regulating American Indian
relationships with sacred sites. 21 Sacred sites are mountains, lakes,
valleys, and other natural features revered by tribal people for
their religious and cultural significance.27 Indian people recognize
sacred sites as formative in tribal creation stories and visit them to
conduct contemporary ceremonies. The relationship between
American Indians and sacred sites is more poignant than one's
attachment to a diamond ring ever could be. To put it in Radin's
terms, the relationship may be more like an individual's
attachment to her second kidney. That is, Indians often assert that
without their sacred sites, they cannot survive as tribess.2 They do
not necessarily mean that each individual tribal member will
literally die, but rather that without the ability to worship, visit, and
take care of a sacred site, it will become impossible to live as
Kiowas or Cherokees, Navajos or Hopis.29
The problem is that our legal system does not protect Indian
relationships with sacred sites, particularly those located on federal
public lands.3° In the famous case of Lyng v. Northwest Indian
Cemetery Association, the Supreme Court held that the First
Amendment did not prevent the United States Forest Service from
engaging in timber development that would destroy a sacred site
located on public lands." Such destruction was allowable because
24. Radin, Property and Personhood, supra note 22, at 1015.
25. See Radin, Market-Inalienability, supra note 23, at 1851.
26. While this is the first Article to consider Radin's theory in the context of
American Indian real property, other scholars have applied Radin's theory to indigenous
intellectual and cultural property. See infra note 192 and accompanying text.
27. For additional background on American Indian sacred sites, see SACRED LANDS OF
INDIAN AMERICA (Charles E. Little & Jake Page eds., 2001); ANDREW GULLIFORD, SACRED
OBJECTS AND SACRED PLACES: PRESERVING TRIBAL TRADITIONS (2000).
28. See BROWN, RELIGION, supra note 1; see also infra note 40.
29. Cf JONATHAN LEAR, RADICAL HOPE: ETHICS IN THE FACE OF CULTURAL
DEVASTATION (2006) (examining how the Crow Nation responded to loss of lands,
buffalo, and warrior culture).
30. See CHRISTINE A. KLEIN, FEDERICO CHEEVER, & BRET C. BIRDSONG, NATURAL
RESOURCES LAW: A PLACE-BASED BOOK OF PROBLEMS AND CASES 103 (2005) (describing
the public lands and the agencies that manage them).
31. Lyng v. Nw. Indian Cemetery Protective Ass'n, 485 U.S. 439, 440-53 (1988).
20081
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the Free Exercise Clause only prevents the government from
imposing religious beliefs on individuals and because the
government has extensive ownership rights over the public lands.32
While generally criticizing Lyng's constricted view of the First
Amendment, scholars contend that federal policy has evolved since
that decision and is now sufficiently protective of Indian interests.
33
Moreover, they laud the administrative process and its ability to
promote cooperation and compromise among multiple users of
the public lands.34 However, this viewpoint needs greater scrutiny.
It is true that recent statutes, regulations, and orders articulate a
policy of solicitude for Indian sacred sites.35 But in practice, these
provide only limited opportunities for Indian participation in the
land management process and no substantive standards for
protecting sacred sites. 6 As a result, federal land managers are free
to permit land uses that desecrate sacred sites and may even
destroy Indian religions."
Recent examples bear out the contention that federal practice
still presents serious risks for Indian sacred sites. In 2005, the
United States Forest Service approved snowmaking using sewage
effluent at a ski resort on San Francisco Peaks in Arizona, 9 a
decision that the Navajo Nation equated to "genocide" because it
would desecrate their most sacred mountain.4" In 2007, the Ninth
Circuit reversed the decision on grounds that the snowmaking
32. Id.
33. See Marcia Yablon, Note, Property Rights and Sacred Sites: Federal Regulatory Responses
to American Indian Religious Claims on Public Land, 113 YALE L.J. 1623, 1628-29 (2004) ("In
foreclosing judicial protection, the Lyng Court shut off one method of protecting sacred
sites, but suggested another, more feasible method in its place-agency accommodation.");
see generally Charlton H. Bonham, Devils Tower, Rainbow Bridge, and the Uphill Battle Facing
Native American Religion on Public Lands, 20 LAW & INEQ. 157, 163-74 (2002).
34. See MICHAEL F. BROWN, WHO OWNS NATIvE CULTURE?, at xi, 10, 144-72 (2003).
35. See infta Part II.
36. See id.
37. See id.
38. See generally Nelson D. Schwartz, Far From the Reservation, but Still Sacred? N.Y.
TIMES, Sunday Business Section at 1, Aug. 12, 2007 (reporting on various off-reservation
sacred sites disputes).
39. Navajo Nation v. U.S. Forest Serv., 408 F. Supp. 2d 866, 871 (D. Ariz. 2006), rev'd,
479 F.3d 1024 (9th Cir. 2007).
40. Cyndy Cole, Snowmaking Opponents Now Targeting City Council, ARIZ. DAILY SUN,
Jan. 13, 2006 ("It is another sad day... [when] in the 21st Century, genocide and religious
persecution continue to be perpetrated on Navajo people [and] other Native Americans..
. who regard the Peaks as sacred.") (quoting Navajo Nation PresidentJoe ShirleyJr.).
[Vol. 27:313
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plan violated the Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 2000
(RFRA),* but the court then granted the government's petition
for rehearing en banc and has not yet issued a final decision.42 In
2008, a federal district court upheld the Bureau of Reclamation's
decision to engage in a federal land transfer ultimately conferring
title on a private company intending to build a fuel refinery on
lands sacred to the Quechan tribe in Arizona.4"
These and other threats to sacred sites devastate Indian
people." But, ultimately they threaten all of us. Most Americans
want to live in a country where everyone enjoys fundamental
freedoms. 5 Indians cannot enjoy religious freedom without the
ability to protect and visit their sacred sites." Thus federal
41. Navajo Nation, 479 F.3d at 1029 (citing 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000bb, 2000bb-1 to 2000bb-
4 (Westlaw 2008)).
42. See Navajo Nation v. U.S. Forest Serv., 506 F.3d 717, 718 (Oct. 17, 2007)
(granting rehearing en banc). This case raises the question of whether RFRA applies on
the public lands, a question that the Supreme Court has not yet addressed. See Note,
Religious Land Use in the Federal Courts Under RLUIPA, 120 HARV. L. REV. 2178, 2194-95
(2007).
43. See Quechan Indian Tribe of Fort Yuma Indian Reservation v. U.S. Dep't of
Interior, No. CV 07-0677-PHX-JAT, 2008 WL 450268 at *12-16 (D. Ariz. February 15,
2008). As a factual matter, it is important to note, as the district court did, that "while
[Arizona Clean Fuels, LLC] has purchased the Transfer Lands site from the District, ACF
has since decided to relocate the oil refinery project to lands that are not involved in the
Title Transfer."). Id. at *3. This case contrasts significantly with another in which a federal
district court found federal agencies liable under the Federal Tort Claims Act for damage
to Quechan sacred sites caused by electrical transmission line pole replacement and line
maintenance project on the reservation. See Quechan Tribe v. United States, 2008 WL
495618, * 5, 37-43 (S.D. Cal.Jan. 10, 2008).
44. See Ed Taylor, U.S. Senators Back Mining Project Through Bill E. VALLEY TRIB., July
24, 2007 (Indian objections to land swap proposal that would give private corporation
about 3025 acres of federal land, including Apache sacred site, to develop an
underground copper ore mine); ARCTIC NATIONAL WILDLIFE REFUGE (ANVR): REVIEW,
CONTROVERSIES AND LEGISLATION (Barbara T. Lieland ed., 2006) (examining legislative
proposals to allow oil drilling in Alaska National Wildlife Refuge, including sacred
birthplace of caribou on which Neet'sai Gwich'in culture depends).
45. Cf NOAH FELDMAN, DIVIDED BY GOD: AMERICAN'S CHURCH-STATE PROBLEM-
AND WHAT WE SHOULD Do ABOUT IT (2005) (examining various viewpoints on religious
freedom in the United States).
46. I assume in this Article that enhanced Indian property rights would promote
fundamental freedoms, especially religious and cultural freedoms at sacred sites. I have
previously considered counter-arguments to this idea. See Kristen A. Carpenter,'A Property
Rights Approach to Sacrede Sites Cases: Asserting a Place for Indians as Non-Owners, 52 UCLA L.
Rev. 1061, 1138-42 (2005). Cf Jane Baron, Property and "No Property", 42 HOUS. L. REV.
1425, 1425-32 (2006) (evaluating the question of whether property promotes freedom);
Lydia Butler, The Pathology Of Property Norms: Living Within Nature's Boundaries, 73 S. CAL. L.
REV. 927, 932 (2000) ("[M]any of the norms, principles, and policies of traditional
STANFORD ENVIRONMENTAL LA WJOURNAL
administrative practice needs to prioritize Indian interests in
sacred sites over uses of the public lands that will harm such sites.
Unfortunately, however, we do not have a legal theory justifying
this position.47 It is in this regard that I believe Radin's work is
useful. Using her framework, we can conceive of sacred sites as
non-fungible real property deserving special legal treatment and
reform federal practice accordingly.
This Article expands upon Radin's approach in several ways.
First, whereas Radin focuses on property that expresses individual
personhood, I am interested in property that expresses collective
"peoplehood". To elaborate on this concept of peoplehood, the
Article draws on the work of political theorists who observe that
individual rights paradigm, so prevalent in the United States, fails
to capture the pervasiveness of subnational (and supranational)
groupings. Thus the term "peoples" thus describes groups that
organize along political, religious, ethnic, and cultural lines." As a
normative concept, the notion of peoplehood dictates that states
should recognize peoples and treat them fairly in furtherance of
democratic ideals.4 With particular inspiration from John Rawls,
the Article argues that Indian tribes are peoples5" whose legitimate
interests in property and religion at sacred sites deserve legal
protection as a testament to American liberty for both individuals
and groups.
Second, whereas Radin calls for enhanced protection of
property that individuals presently own (their diamond rings and
American property law inherently conflict with the goal of effective ecosystem
management over the long term.").
47. See Erik B. Bluemel, Accommodating Native American Cultural Activities on Federal
Public Lands, 41 IDAHO L. REv. 475, 548 (2005) (criticizing sacred sites scholarship that
fails to "provide a mechanism by which to prioritize the two competing sets of human
values raised by owners and non-owners or between recreational or developmental uses
and cultural uses of public lands"); see also LLOYD BURTON, WORSHIP AND WILDERNESS:
CULTURE, RELIGION, AND LAW IN PUBLIC LANDS MANAGEMENT 292 (2002) ("The problem
in the free exercise'/sacred sites cases is that instead of [American Indians] being
accorded some form of elevated status, their rights have been assigned a status at or very
near the bottom.").
48. See, e.g., ROGERS M. SMITH, STORIES OF PEOPLEHOOD: THE POLITICS AND MORALS
OF POLITICAL MEMBERSHIP 20 (2003); see alsoJOHN LIE, MODERN PEOPLEHOOD (2004).
49. JOHN RAwLS, THE LAW OF PEOPLES 25 (1999).
50. Cf Nell Jessup Newton, Indian Claims in the Courts of the Conqueror, 41 AM. U. L.
REV. 753, 776, 779, 781 & n.142 (1992) (arguing that "right to exist as a tribe" implicates
issues of peoplehood).
51. See RAWLS, supra note 49, at 39, 124.
[Vol. 27:313
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homes), I advocate for enhanced protection of property that
Indian tribes no longer own (their sacred sites on public lands)."
This latter point builds on my own work arguing for the property
rights of Indians as non-owners of sacred sites53 and more broadly
on the work of legal scholars who describe property as a system
wherein human values should sometimes trump the rights of
owners. 54 It further highlights the reparative aspect of recognizing
Indian interests in sacred sites that the federal government
originally acquired through the conquest of North America.
In Part II, the Article sets forth the current legal framework
governing sacred sites claims, focusing on Lyng and two
subsequent federal appellate cases marking important
developments in the law." Evaluating the strengths and weaknesses
of each case, this Part makes the case for a new theory to animate
federal sacred sites policy. In Part III, the Article sets forth a theory
of "real property and peoplehood." It draws from both property
and political theory to argue that Indian interests in sacred sites on
the public lands deserve heightened legal protection because they
are integral to Indian peoplehood. In Part IV the Article advocates
practical ways to reform the administration of federal sacred sites
policy consistent with the theory of real property and peoplehood.
As a procedural matter, it suggests that peoples have a special role
to play in federal land management and, substantively, that
administrative officials should prioritize Indian needs at sacred
sites claims over competing uses of the public lands, especially
those that may be realized elsewhere or foregone for monetary
compensation. Part V concludes by considering other applications
of the real property and peoplehood theory that, like the sacred
sites context, provide an opportunity for American Indian and
American peoplehood interests to converge.
52. See, e.g., BURTON, supra note 47, at 34-35 (describing certain Indian rituals that
"originated on lands... tribes once inhabited but no longer control").
53. Carpenter, supra note 46.
54. See generally JOSEPH WILLIAM SINGER, ENTITLEMENT: THE PARADOXES OF
PROPERTY (2000).
55. See William Bradford, Beyond Reparations: An American Indian Theory of Justice, 66
OHIO ST. L.J. 1 (2005) (arguing that Indian property deprivations could serve as a basis for
reparations).
56. See Lyng v. Nw. Indian Cemetery Protective Ass'n, 485 U.S. 439 (1988); Bear
Lodge Multiple Use Ass'n v. Babbitt, 175 F.3d 814 (10th Cir. 1999); Navajo Nation v. U.S.
Forest Serv., 479 F.3d 1024 (9th Cir. 2007).
2008]
STANFORD ENVIRONMENTAL LA WJOURNAL
II. THE LEGAL FRAMEWORK ON SACRED SITES
"Whatever rights the Indians may have to use of the [sacred] area,
however, these rights do not divest the Government of its right to use what
is, after all, its land. 
7
A. The First Amendment: Lyng (1988)
The Supreme Court reviewed the First Amendment's
applicability to sacred sites disputes in Lyng v. Northwest Indian
Cemetery Association."8 This case has been the subject of extensive
scholarly commentary5 9 and will be discussed briefly here.
In Lyng several Northern California Indian tribes challenged
the federal government's decision to build a road through a site
where tribal religious practitioners gathered medicine and
prepared for ceremonial dances.6" The sacred area in Lyng, known
as the "High Country" or "Medicine Rocks," was within the tribes'
traditional territory. In the mid-nineteenth century however,
California tribes experienced land conquest at its worst. In one
decade, white settlers massacred thousands of Indians and the
federal government wiped out Indian land title to the entire state.6"
By the 1970s, when the dispute underlying Lyng arose, the
sacred lands at issue were located in the Six Rivers National Forest,
owned by government and managed by the United States Forest
Service.62 Before recommending the road and logging project, the
57. Lyng, 485 U.S. at 453.
58. Id.
59. See infra note 77.
60. Lyng, 485 U.S. at 443.
61. See RUSSELL THORNTON, AMERICAN INDIAN HOLOCAUST AND SURVIVAL: A
POPULATION HISTORY SINCE 1492, 107-09 (1987) (describing the Gold Rush-era
"genocide" of California Indians in which "primarily because of the killings, the California
Indian population... decreased almost by two-thirds in little more than a single decade:
from 100,000 in 1849 to 35,000 in 1860"); see also Amy C. Brann, Comment, Karuk Tribe of
California v. United States: The Courts Need a History Lesson, 37 NEw ENG. L. REv. 743 (2003)
(noting that although eighteen treaties were negotiated with California tribes, the Senate
refused to ratify them and instead passed the California Land Claims Act of 1851, which
effectively transferred all Indian aboriginal title to the public domain).
62. See KLEIN ET AL., supra note 30, at 103 (describing how 654 acres of public lands
are primarily managed by four federal agencies: the United States Forest Service, located
within the Department of Agriculture (192 million acres); and the National Park Service
(79 million acres), Bureau of Land Management (180 million acres), and Fish and
Wildlife Service (93 million acres), all within the Department of Interior).
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Forest Service commissioned a study of Indian religious uses. The
study found that the area was "significant as an integral and
indispensable part of Indian religious conceptualization and
practice."6 Such religious activities were "dependent upon and
facilitated by certain qualities of the physical environment, the
most important of which are privacy, silence, and an undisturbed
natural sett;--."6 Because the road construction "would cause
serious and irreparable damage to the sacred areas which are an
integral and necessary part of the belief systems and lifeway of
Northwest California Indian peoples," the report recommended
against pursuing the project."
Despite these findings, the Forest Service approved the project,
and attempted to mitigate Indian and environmental concerns by
choosing a road location "as far as possible" from archaeological
sites and contemporary Indian activities.66 A location that would
have avoided Chimney Rock, a specific sacred area, was rejected
because of soil stability problems and the need to acquire private
land. 7 Finding these accommodation efforts unsatisfactory, the
Indians sued under the First Amendment, several federal statutes,
and common law doctrines.6" The District Court enjoined the road
and timber project on grounds that it would substantially infringe
on the Indians' religion and that the government had failed to
demonstrate a compelling interest under the Free Exercise
Clause.69 The 9th Circuit affirmed."
The Supreme Court reversed, holding that even if the road
would "virtually destroy" the Indians' ability to practice their
religion, the government's action would not violate the Free
Exercise Clause because it would not "coerce individuals into
63. Lyng, 485 U.S. at 442.
64. Id.
65. Id.
66. Id. at 443.
67. Id.
68. Nw. Indian Cemetery Protective Ass'n v. Peterson, 565 F. Supp. 586, 590-91 (N.D.
Cal. 1983).
69. Id. at 595-96.
70. Nw. Indian Cemetery Protective Ass'n v. Peterson, 764 F.2d 581 (9th Cir. 1985),
affd on reh'g, 795 F.2d 688 (9th Cir. 1986). By the time the Ninth Circuit heard the case,
Congress had enacted the California Wilderness Act of 1984, restricting commercial
activities such as logging in much, but not all, of the contested area. See Lyng, 485 U.S. at
444-45.
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acting contrary to their religious beliefs.' And secondly, Justice
O'Connor held that "[w] hatever rights the Indians may have to use
of the area .... these rights do not divest the Government of its
right to use what is, after all, its land."72 Lyng thus stands for the
proposition that the First Amendment allows the government to
destroy Indian sacred sites located on public lands, so long as this
action does not coerce religious belief.
7
Lyng did recognize some basis for the government to
accommodate Indian sacred site usage on a voluntary,
discretionary basis. In particular, the Court referenced the
American Indian Religious Freedom Act of 1978, which provides:
It shall be the policy of the United States to protect and preserve
for American Indians their inherent right of freedom to believe,
express, and exercise the[ir] traditional religions ... , including
but not limited to access to sites, use and possession of sacred
objects, and the freedom to worship through ceremonials and
traditional rites.
7 4
Lyng held that although this statute created no enforceable rights,
it nonetheless embodied a strong statement of federal policy.
O'Connor wrote in dicta: "[N]othing in our opinion should be
read to encourage governmental insensitivity to the religious needs
of any citizen."75 And, more specifically, "the Government's rights
to the use of its own land ... need not and should not discourage
it from accommodating religious practices like those engaged in by
the Indian respondents."
76
Lyng could be perceived as an opinion that usefully sets out a
bright-line rule. It makes clear that the government has no
obligation to Indian religious practitioners on the public lands but
may use its discretion to accommodate them. Yet the case has
other limitations. It leaves Indian people without enforceable
rights at sacred sites and effectively holds that the First
Amendment does not apply to a major category of religious
worship. Lyng thus represents a problematically ethnocentric view
71. Lyng, 485 U.S. at 450-51.
72. Id. at 453.
73. Id. at 447-53.
74. 42 U.S.C. § 1996 (Westlaw 2008).
75. Lyng, 485 U.S. at 453.
76. Id. at 454.
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of the First Amendment, criticized by many scholars as
inappropriately limiting religious freedom for minority religious
practitioners77-and expanding the federal government's power as
an owner of the public lands.78 I will not rehash these criticisms
here.
Lyng's jurisprudential failings can, however, inspire
contemporary advocates to deal with the larger problem of
categorizing Indian sacred sites claims. 9 Tribal relationships with
sacred sites depart in some ways from the notion of "religion,"" at
least as courts have construed the term.8' Unlike some Western
traditions, Indian spirituality is difficult to capture in an abstract or
broad set of intellectual beliefs.82 Spiritual concepts are bound up
with associated ritual practices (such as preparing and taking
medicine, and participating in dances, sweat lodges, prayers),
which can only take place at certain sacred mountains, lakes,
buttes, and valleys. Moreover, Indian "religions" permeate every
part of tribal life, such as subsistence hunting and agriculture,
traditional oral storytelling, kinship responsibilities, interpersonal
77. See, e.g., Ira Lupu, Where Rights Begin: The Problem of Burdens on the Free Exercise of
Religion, 102 HARV. L. REV. 933, 944-46; Michael W. McConnell, The Origins and Historical
Understanding of Free Exercise of Religion, 103 HARV. L. REV. 1409, 1486 (1990); Michael W.
McConnell, Religious Freedom at a Crossroads, 59 U. CHI. L. REV. 115, 125-26 (1992); S. Alan
Ray, Comment, Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Association: Government
Property Rights and the Free Exercise Clause, 16 HASTINGS CONST. L. Q. 483, 490-510 (1989);
Peggy Healy, Case Note, Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Association: A
Form-Over-Effect Standard for the Free Exercise Clause, 20 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 171 (1988); Kathryn
C. Wyatt, Note, The Supreme Court, Lyng, and The Lone Wolf Principle, 65 CHI.-KENT L. REv.
623, 625 (1989); J. Brett Pritchard, Note, Conduct and Belief in the Free Exercise Clause:
Developments and Deviations in Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Association,
76 CORNELL L. REV. 268 (1990).
78. See generally Carpenter, supra note 46, at 1082-87, 1092-93.
79. See Sequoyah v. Tenn. Valley Auth., 620 F.2d 1159, 1165 (6th Cir. 1980)
("[T]hough cultural history and tradition are vitally important to any group of people,
these are not interests protected by the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment.").
80. For thoughtful commentary on definitional issues in. religious scholarship, see
generally HOW SHOULD WE TALK ABOUT RELIGION? PERSPECTIVES, CONTEXTS,
PARTICULARITIES (James Boyd White ed., 2006).
81. See Lyng, 485 U.S. at 459-60 (Brennan, J., dissenting) ("[A] ny attempt to isolate
the religious aspects of Indian life is in reality an exercise which forces Indian concepts
into non-Indian categories.") (internal quotations and citations omitted).
82. See id. at 460-61 (Brennan, J., dissenting) ("Established or universal truths-the
mainstay of Western religions-play no part in Indian faith. Ceremonies are communal
efforts undertaken for specific purposes in accordance with instructions handed down
from generation to generation.... Where dogma lies at the heart of Western religions,
Native American faith is inextricably bound to the use of land.").
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relations, and sense of place. Accordingly Indian ceremonial
practices are not undertaken for one person's salvation, but for the
well-being of tribal people and the entire world.
A broader conception of "religion" may not be unique to tribal
peoples. Other religious traditions, including Judaism and
Christianity, also have important ritualistic or practice-based
aspects, as well as sacred places around the world. 4 There are
devout practitioners of every faith whose religious beliefs guide
their private conduct and still others who insist that religion
should guide public policy as well. 3 Viewed in this light, Lyng may
represent a view of religion that is too narrow not only for Indians
but for other religious adherents as well.
For present purposes, however, the point is that American
Indian relationships with sacred sites are quite broad-while the
federal courts' approach to free exercise claims is narrow.8" For
these reasons, advocates need to find a way to secure legal
protection for the multi-faceted nature of Indian relationships with
sacred sites. Such legal protection should also reflect Indian
understandings of their own cultural and religious practices,
rather than ill-fitting categorizations from other traditions. The
federal administrative process provides great potential to offer
such meaningful protection of Indian sacred sites practices,
though as I will argue in the next section, this potential remains
unrealized.
83. See Thomas Buckley, Renewal as Discourse and Discourse as Renewal in Native
Northwestern Caliornia, in NATIvE RELIGIONS AND CULTURES OF NORTH AMERICA:
ANTHROPOLOGY OF THE SACRED 33, 33 (Lawrence E. Sullivan ed., 2000) (analyzing world-
renewal "Jump Dance" which "is intended to cure the world's ills, and to stave off evil");
e.g., Lyng, 485 U.S. at 460 (Brennan, J., dissenting) ("Failure to conduct these ceremonies
in the manner and place specified, adherents believe, will result in great harm to the earth
and to the people whose welfare depends upon it.").
84. SeeJoseph William Singer, Property and Coercion in Federal Indian Law: The Conflict
Between Critical and Complacent Pragnatism, 63 S. CAL. L. REV. 1821, 1832 (1990).
85. Cf FELDMAN, supra note 45, at 3, 150-234 (identifying the position that religious
principles should instruct public policy as "values evangelism" and contrasting it with a
"legal secularist" approach in which religious values should remain a private matter).
86. See Sequoyah v. Tenn. Valley Auth., 620 F.2d 1159, 1164 (6th Cir. 1980)
(rejecting Indian religious freedom claim on ground that claims were more cultural and
historical than religious).
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B. Administrative Practice: Bear Lodge (1998)
Following Lyng, federal policy changed to become more
protective of Indian interests in sacred sites. This section will
briefly review these policy developments and then discuss their
application in the Tenth Circuit's Bear Lodge case and its progeny.
In 1992 Congress amended the National Historic Preservation
Act (NHPA) to extend its protections to certain Indian sacred
sites." The NHPA now provides that "properties of traditional
religious and cultural importance to an Indian tribe" (TCPs) may
be determined eligible for inclusion on the National Register of
Historic Places.88 Federal agencies are directed to consult "with any
tribe ... that attaches religious and cultural significance" to such
properties regarding federal "undertakings" that affect TCPs.s9
In 1996, President Clinton issued an Executive Order
pertaining to Indian sacred sites. It requires federal agencies to
"accommodate access to and ceremonial use of Indian sacred sites
by Indian religious practitioners and avoid adversely affecting the
physical integrity of such sacred sites.""0 Procedurally, the agencies
must give notice to tribal governments when federal management
may affect sacred sites and consult with tribal leaders regarding
such plans."
While the 1996 Executive Order expressed a substantive
directive to "avoid adversely affecting ... sacred sites," it was, by its
own terms, explicitly unenforceable against the United States." Yet
a number of agencies have developed internal guidelines in favor
of sacred site protections.9" The Park Service's Management Policies
explains that the Park Service "will develop and implement its
87. See National Historic Preservation Act, 16 U.S.C. §§ 470-71 (Westlaw 2008); see
also Dean B. Suagee, Historical Storytelling and the Growth of Tribal Historic Preservation
Programs, 17 NAT. RESOURCES & ENV'T 86, 86-87 (2002) (describing 1992 amendments to
the NHPA and implementing regulations); Peter J. Gardner, The First Amendment's
Unfulfilled Promise in Protecting Native American Sacred Sites: Is the National Historic Preservation
Act a Better Alternative?, 47 S.D. L. REv. 68, 79-82 (2002); Dean B. Suagee, Tribal Voices in
Historic Preservation: Sacred Landscapes, Cross-Cultured Bridges, and Common Ground, 21 VT. L.
REV. 145, 160 (1996).
88. 16 U.S.C. § 470a-470f (Westlaw 2008).
89. Id.
90. Exec. Order No. 13007, 3 C.F.R. 196 (1996).
91. Id.
92. Id.
93. Here I focus on the Park Service and Forest Service as the agencies that address
the majority of sacred sites disputes.
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programs in a manner that reflects knowledge of and respect for
the cultures of Native American tribes or groups with
demonstrated ancestral ties to particular resources in parks."94
Procedurally, the policy provides that, through its
Superintendents, the Park Service will consult with tribes
regarding administration of parks including sacred sites.95
Substantively, the Park Service is to undertake "decisions [that]
reflect knowledge about and understanding of potentially affected
Native American cultures and people, gained through research
and consultations with the potentially affected groups."96
The Forest Service's National Resource Guide to American Indian
and Alaska Native Relations acknowledges federal obligations at
sacred sites arising from the government-to-government
relationship, contemporary assertions of tribal sovereignty, and the
fact that the USFS and Indian nations are often contemporary
"neighbors."97 It recognizes that even though "[Forest Service]
lands are public... [and] most Indian title to these lands has been
extinguished," the Forest Service nevertheless "has to be
concerned where there are-tribal rights reserved by treaty,
spiritual and cultural values and practices. '"" The Forest Service
Guide instructs its employees to "walk the land with American
Indians ... to gain an understanding and appreciation of their
culture, religion, beliefs, and practices."99 The substantive goal is to
"identify and acknowledge [Indian] cultural needs . . . and
consider these values as an important part of management of the
national forest."100
These post-Lyng evolutions in administrative law were tested in
Bear Lodge Multiple Use Association v. Babbitt, a 1998 case involving
Devil's Tower National Monument. The Tower, known to some
Plains Indians as "Bear Lodge," is a place of historical and
94. U.S. DEP'T OF THE INTERIOR, NATIONAL PARK SERVICE MANAGEMENT POLICIES
2001 89 (2000), available at http://www.nps.gov/refdesk/mp/chapter8.pdf.
95. Id.
96. Id.
97. U.S. FOREST SERV., FOREST SERVICE NATIONAL RESOURCE GUIDE TO AMERICAN
INDIAN AND ALASKA NATIVE RELATIONS, xi (1997), available at
http://www.fs.fed.us/people/tribal/tribexec.pdf.
98. Id. at 36.
99. Id. at 59.
100. Id.
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contemporary cultural significance to at least six tribes.' As part of
the Black Hills, the Tower was originally reserved to the Great
Sioux Nation with the Black Hills in the Treaty of Fort Laramie of
1868, which was soon thereafter violated by the United States.
0 2
Devils Tower became a National Monument in 1906, and is now
managed by the Park Service." 3 By the 1990's, conflicting use
patterns of rock climbers, local citizens, tourists, environmental
groups, and Indian religious practitioners were creating
management challenges for the Park Service.' 4
The Park Service was obligated to manage these conflicting
uses at Devils Tower, not only by the NHPA,'° 5 but also by the
National Park Service Organic Act and the Presidential
Proclamation establishing Devil's Tower as a National
Monument. 6 After a planning process, including public meetings,
circulation of drafts, and a formal notice and comment period, the
Devils Tower Superintendent announced a management plan
banning commercial rock climbing during the month of June,
when most religious ceremonies were conducted. 7 The Plan also
called for educational programs on Indian religious and cultural
uses and mitigation of climbing's effects on the environment
through reduced use of pitons and closure of routes near raptor
nests.'
The Bear Lodge Multiple Use Association filed suit,
challenging the plan primarily on Establishment Clause grounds,
and the NPS changed the climbing ban to a voluntary closure."
101. Bear Lodge Multiple Use Ass'n v. Babbitt, 175 F.3d 814, 815 (10th Cir. 1999).
102. See Ray H. Mattison, Nat'l Park Serv., Devil's Tower History: Our First Fifty Years
(1955), http://www.nps.gov/deto/first50.htm ("[T]he Treaty of 1868 guaranteed this
region to the Indians. In 1874, in violation of this treaty, General George A. Custer led a
reconnaissance expedition into the Black Hills.").
103. BearLodge, 175 F.3d at 819.
104. Id.
105. Id. at817-18.
106. Id. at 819 & n.7 ("Under its governing statute, NPS must protect the values for
which Devils Tower national monument was established.... One of the primary bases for
the Tower's designation as a National Monument is the prominent role it has played in the
cultures of several American Indian tribes of the North Plains .... President Roosevelt
declared the Tower is 'a natural wonder and an object of historic and great scientific
interest... [and] warning is hereby given to all unauthorized persons not to appropriate,
injure, or destroy any feature of the natural tower."').
107. See Bear Lodge, 175 F.3d at 819.
108. See Bear Lodge Multiple Use Ass'n v. Babbitt, 2 F. Supp. 2d 1448, 1450.
109. See id.
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The federal district court upheld the plan, ruling that it did not
violate the Establishment Clause because it advanced secular
purposes, did not have the primary effect of advancing religion,
and did not entangle the government with religion."' On appeal,
the Tenth Circuit affirmed, but not on the merits. It held that
because the plan made the climbing restrictions "voluntary" and
the plaintiff climbers had continued climbing, they suffered no
injury and therefore lacked standing to sue."' The Supreme Court
denied certiorari.1
2
Thus while Bear Lodge is a circuit court decision, it effectively set
the standard for agency accommodation. Following Bear Lodge,
agencies are likely to offer modest accommodations of Indian
religious practices, with the expectation that they will withstand
Establishment Clause challenges, particularly if they request
"voluntary" compliance or refrain from causing "actual injury" to
would-be challengers. Thus in Natural Arch and Bridge (2000), a
court upheld the Park Service's implementation of a management
plan requesting "voluntary compliance" in which tourists are asked
to walk around a sandstone bridge, rather than under it, out of
respect for Navajo religious traditions."3
Scholars laud the administrative process as a beacon of
tolerance and accommodation in sacred sites cases, and consider
Bear Lodge a model of improved administrative practice."' Bear
Lodge certainly represents an important development over agency
policy of the Lyng era. Federal land use officials worked closely
with tribal people and developed a management plan reflecting
some of their religious needs. The fact that the tribes did not
challenge the management plan may indicate some satisfaction
with it-even after the Park Service changed the climbing
moratorium from mandatory to voluntary.
110. See id. at 1454 (applying Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971) (articulating
Establishment Clause test)).
111. See Bear Lodge, 175 F.3d at 821 (applying Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S.
555 (1992) (articulating the standing test)).
112. See Bear Lodge Multiple Use Ass'n v. Babbitt, 529 U.S. 1037 (2000).
113. See Natural Arch & Bridge Soc'y v. Alston, 98 Fed. Appx. 711, 716 (10th Cir.
2004) (upholding National Park Service plan asking tourists to refrain from walking under
a sandstone bridge out of respect for Native American religious beliefs on grounds that
plaintiffs had not suffered an actual injury and thus lacked standing to bring
Establishment Clause challenge).
114. SeeBROWN, supra note 34, at xi, 144-72.
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Bear Lodge thus affirms the idea that agencies can, if they want,
use their discretion to accommodate sacred site usage, but
agencies have no obligation to prioritize Indian claims or even to
offer them a meaningful baseline of protection. When all is said
and done, the Devil's Tower climbing management plan merely
asks that climbers consider refraining from climbing one month of
the year and offers tourists some educational programs about
Indians. This "accommodation" of Indian religious practices
ultimately requires those religious practices to yield to the interests
of climbers and tourists.15 Rock climbers can, in fact, climb Devil's
Tower during Indian religious ceremonies, even if those
ceremonies will be disrupted. Rock climbing and tourism are
legitimate uses of the public lands-but it is difficult to see how
they should trump the religious practices of Indian tribes who have
historic treaty claims to occupy such lands1 6 and claim that their
wellbeing as a tribe depends on continued use of these lands."7
Following Bear Lodge, the Forest Service has adopted a practice
of using its discretion to accommodate Indian sacred sites' needs
in some cases. One notable decision was Wyoming Sawmills (2004)
involving the Medicine Wheel National Monument in Wyoming."'
The Forest Service issued a management plan for the sacred
Medicine Wheel providing that the Forest Service would consult
with outside parties, including Indian organizations and historic
preservation officers, regarding any project within 18,000-20,000
acres around the Medicine Wheel."9 As authority for the plan, the
Forest Service cited NHPA, AIRFA, President Clinton's 1996
115. See GULLIFORD, supra note 27, at 166 ("Even when climbers are asked not to
interfere with our people when we are praying, some of them keep on climbing [at Mato
Tipila] . . . . The vision quest ceremony requires a year of preparation but the young
people couldn't finish what they started because they weren't left alone; the climbers
interfered.") (quoting Romanus Bear Stops, Cheyenne River Sioux traditional leader).
116. See, e.g., Alexandra New Holy, The Heart of Everything That Is: Paha Sapa, Treaties,
and Lakota Identity, 23 OKLA. CITY U. L. REv. 317, 321-22 (1998) (describing ongoing claims
to the Black Hills under the 1868 Treaty of Fort Laramie).
117. See, e.g., Bear Lodge, 175 F.3d at 817 (citing Lakota views that the "traditional
religious uses" of Devil's Tower are "vital to the health of our nation and to our self-
determination as a Tribe. Those who use the butte to pray become stronger. They gain
sacred knowledge from the spirits that helps us to preserve our Lakota culture and way of
life. They become leaders. Without their knowledge and leadership, we cannot continue to
determine our destiny.").
118. SeeWyo. Sawmills Inc. v. U.S. Forest Serv., 383 F.3d 1241 (10th Cir. 2004).
119. Seeid. at 1245.
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Executive Order and several archaeological protection statutes. 121
After adopting the management plan, the Forest Service
decided not to hold several previously advertised timber sales
within the Medicine Wheel management area. 2' The Wyoming
Sawmills Corporation sued, alleging violations of the
Establishment Clause and National Forest Management Act.122 The
Tenth Circuit held, however, that the company lacked standing to
sue on its claim of lost opportunity to bid on future timber sales
and that the Forest Service's actions were within its substantial
discretion.2 3
Bear Lodge and Wyoming Sawmills both reflect agencies' power to
accommodate sacred sites practices if they wish (as O'Connor
suggested in Lyng) and their adherence to subsequent
developments in federal policy (such as NHPA's consultation
process). Both announced management plans that avoided "actual
injury" to non-Indian users of the public lands. Yet, the Forest
Service plan actually prevented timber harvesting at the Medicine
Wheel, whereas the Park Service plan did not prevent rock
climbing at Devil's Tower. To determine the effectiveness of these
plans, one would need to survey the Indian religious practitioners
with respect to their ability to practice their religion. Yet, even a
superficial review suggests that the Forest Service in Wyoming
Sawmills seems to have used its discretion to effectuate a
management plan with more teeth than did the Park Service in
Bear Lodge.
Thus under Bear Lodge and its progeny, the decision about
whether, and to what extent, an agency will accommodate Indian
needs at sacred sites is left to agency discretion. Under the Ninth
Circuit's recent Navajo Nation case, however, it appears that two
recent federal statutes may begin to impose greater requirements
on agencies to respect Indian religious freedom at sacred sites.
C. Statutory Reform: Navajo Nation (2007)
Navajo Nation v. Forest Service was the first major case to consider
120. See id.
121. See id.
122. See id. at 1243, 1245-56.
123. See id. at 1248-49, 1252.
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the applicability of two new religious freedoms statutes to sacred
sites cases.'24 The Religious Freedoms Restoration Act of 1993
(RFRA) 2 5 and the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized
Persons Act of 2000 (RLUIPA)126 potentially, though not explicitly,
offer protection for federal land use practices that burden Indian
worship at sacred sites. This section will describe these statutes and
then analyze the Ninth Circuit's treatment of them in Navajo
Nation.
Passed in response to the Supreme Court's 1990 decision in
Employment Division v. Smith, rejecting Indian Free Exercise clause
claims in an Indian peyote case, RFRA aims to restore earlier First
Amendment standards protecting religious freedom.127 RFRA
provides that the government shall not substantially burden a
person's exercise of religion, even if the burden results from a rule
of general applicability, unless it can show the burden on religion
furthers a compelling governmental interest and is the least
restrictive means of furthering that interest.'28 RFRA has been
ruled unconstitutional as applied to state governments, 29 but it still
applies to the federal government.3 '
RLUIPA expands religious freedom protections for prisoners
and property owners.' It allows federal and state prisoners to seek
religious accommodations pursuant to the same standard as set
forth in RFRA. 32 It also limits the government's ability to use land
use regulation to interfere with religious institutions that have a
property interest in their religious facility.33 Beyond these two
specific contexts, RLUIPA also amends RFRA to expand the
definition of "exercise of religion" as described in greater detail
124. See Navajo Nation v. U.S. Forest Serv., 479 F.3d 1024, 1048 (9th Cir. 2007).
125. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000bb, 2000bb-1 to 2000bb-4 (Westlaw 2008).
126. Id. §§ 2000cc, 2000cc-1 to 2000cc-5 (Westlaw 2008).
127. See Gonzales v. 0 Centro Espirita Beneficente Uniao do Vegetal, 546 U.S. 418,
418 (2006) ("Congress enacted . . . RFRA . . . in response to Employment Div., Dept. of
Human Resources of Ore. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990) ... where, in upholding a generally
applicable law that burdened the sacramental use of peyote, this court held that the First
Amendment's Free Exercise Clause does not require judges to engage in a case-by-case
assessment of the religious burdens imposed by facially constitutional laws.").
128. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000bb-1 (a)-(b) (Westlaw 2008).
129. City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997).
130. See Gonzales, 546 U.S. at 424.
131. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000cc to 20000cc-5 (Westlaw 2008).
132. Id. § 2000cc-1.
133. Id. § 2000cc.
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below.13 4
The Supreme Court has applied these statutes broadly. In
Cutter v. Wilkinson prisoners practicing "non-mainstream religions"
such as the Satanist, Wicca, Asatru, and Church of Jesus Christ-
Christian religions claimed that prison officials violated RLUIPA by
restricting religious literature, dress, group worship, chaplain
services, and ceremonial items."5 The prisons responded that
RLUIPA violated the Establishment Clause by providing greater
protections for religious freedom than the First Amendment.136 In
upholding RLUIPA, the Court recognized that the "political
branches could shield religious exercise through legislative
accommodation" consistent with the Establishment Clause.
137
In Gonzales v. 0 Centro Espirita Beneficente Uniao Do Vegetal, the
Court applied RFRA to prevent the federal government from
enforcing a ban on a church's use of a hoasca, a sacramental,
hallucinogenic tea. 31 It held that the government failed to show a
compelling interest under the Controlled Substances Act,
especially given that it makes exceptions for other religious users
of Schedule I substances. 13 Though the Court acknowledged the
government's interest in uniform administration of drug laws and
promoting public safety and welfare,14 it also emphasized that
Congress expressly restored the compelling interest test to
situations like that experienced by the UDV church.4 ' Under this
standard, the government did not provide enough evidence to
justify its burden on the sacramental use of hoasca.'42
Some commentators believe the unanimous decision in 0
Centro may signal a new willingness of the Supreme Court, under
Chief Justice Roberts, to consider seriously Congress' intent in
restoring religious liberty in the post-Smith era.'43 At the very least,
134. Id. § 2000cc-3.
135. Cutter v. Wilkinson, 544 U.S. 709, 713 (2005).
136. Id.
137. Id. at 714.
138. Gonzales v. 0 Centro Espirita Beneficente Uniao do Vegetal, 546 U.S. 418, 418-
19 (2006).
139. Id. at 433-34.
140. Id. at 436, 438.
141. Id. at 429-30.
142. Id. at 438.
143. David L. Hudson, Jr., Tea and Sympathy: High Court Backs Religion Law: This Time,
Ruling in Religious Drug-Use Case Favors Sacramental Rites, A.B.A. J. E-REP., Feb. 24, 2006, at 1
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tribal advocates can cite 0 Centro for the unremarkable point that
RFRA mandates a compelling interest analysis when federal
programs of general applicability burden religious freedoms, and
argue that this principle should apply to Indian sacred sites. This
theory has worked in one major lawsuit to date-Navajo Nation v.
Forest Service.'"
The dispute adjudicated in Navajo Nation arose when the Forest
Service approved the Arizona Snowbowl's proposal to use sewage
effluent in snowmaking and expand facilities at the ski resort that
it operates on the San Francisco Peaks.4 5 For six southwestern
tribes, including the Navajo and Hopi, the Peaks are one of the
most sacred places to their religion, the site of tribal origin stories,
contemporary prayers, rituals, and medicine gathering.'46 Located
within the Coconino National Forest, the Peaks are protected as a
"traditional cultural property" under federal law.'47 As a result of
the consultation process mandated by the NHPA and NEPA, the
Forest Service was well aware of the Peaks' religious significance
and the tribes' belief that snowmaking using sewage effluent would
desecrate the Peaks and harm religious practices. 4 ' Yet, the Forest
Service approved the snowmaking plan, with accommodations to
Indian tribes, including the avoidance of shrines in trail expansion
and free rides on ski area chairlift for religious practitioners.'49 The
tribes sued under RFRA and other statutes, and the district court
affirmed on grounds that Lyng foreclosed relief for individuals
claiming government regulation of the public lands burdened
(quoting Anthony Picarello, president of the Becket Fund for Religious Liberty, who called
Gonzales a "thumping victory for religious accommodation laws [and] [i] t's especially good
news for religious minorities").
144. Navajo Nation v. U.S. Forest Serv., 479 F.3d 1024 (9th Cir. 2007).
145. Id. at 1029, 1030.
146. Id. at 1034-44.
147. Id. at 1029.
148. Id. at 1059.
149. Navajo Nation, 408 F. Supp. 2d at 880 & n.10 (noting that the Forest Service's
mitigating measures included: "(1) access [for religious practitioners] before, during and
after construction; (2) protection and regeneration of plants of traditional importance;
(3) that the Forest Service must work to ensure that current ceremonial activities continue
uninterrupted; (4) that the Forest Service must protect shrines; (5) that tribes must be
provided water-quality information; and (6) where practicable, projects must take
advantage of previously-disturbed areas. . . . [Additionally] the agency has guaranteed
traditional cultural practitioners access.., as well as free use of the ski lifts in the summer.
The agency has also committed to working to protect any plants of traditional importance
that may be subsequently identified in the project area.").
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religious practice. 5 '
But the lawsuit did not arise under the First Amendment. The
Ninth Circuit believed it was bound to apply RFRA's broad
protections for religious exercise. Under RFRA, the court found
that using sewage effluent in snowmaking would cause a
"substantial burden" to Navajo and Hopi religions in two ways.
First, it would make certain practices (namely, the Navajo
blessingway and other healing ceremonies and Hopi kachina
dances and prayers) impossible "because the ceremon[ies]
require [] collecting natural resources that would be too
contaminated-physically, spiritually, or both-for sacramental
use."15' Second, the snowmaking would cause a broader burden in
the form of the tribes' inability to maintain "an entire way of life"
based on religious practices that "require belief in the mountain's
purity or a spiritual connection to the mountain that would be
undermined by the contamination." 52 This second burden
referred to the fact that the San Francisco Peaks pervade Navajo
and Hopi traditional religious life, 5 ' from certain practices to
entire systems of ritual observances that are thought to support
corn crops. 4 Thus the tribal plaintiffs had demonstrated evidence
of a "substantial burden.'1
55
To justify this burden, the government and Snowbowl asserted
two compelling interests: (1) meeting the Forest Service's multiple-
use mandate including managing public lands for recreational
uses like skiing and (2) protecting skier safety on the public lands
by upgrading the ski resort. The Ninth Circuit held that fulfilling
the multiple use mandate was a "broadly formulated interest[]
justifying the general applicability of government mandates" of the
sort the Supreme Court had rejected as a compelling interest in
the 0 Centro case. 156 The Forest Service and Snowbowl tried to
make the more particularized argument that snowmaking would
allow a more "reliable and consistent operating season.' ' 57 But the
court rejected the idea that approving snowmaking "at an already
150. Id. at 904-06.
151. Navajo Nation, 479 F.3d at 1039.
152. Id.
153. See id. at 1041-43.
154. See id. at 1034.
155. Id. at 1043.
156. Id. at 1044.
157. Id.
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functioning commercial ski area" demonstrated a governmental
interest "of the highest order."'5
The court finally tried to put things in perspective, imagining
what would happen if the government required Christians to use
sewage effluent in baptisms.'59 Given the equally sensitive nature of
the issue here, the court stated: "[I]f [the tribes] do not have a
valid RFRA claim in this case, we are unable to see how any Native
American plaintiff can ever have a successful RFRA claim based on
beliefs and practices tied to land they hold sacred."6 °
Navajo Nation shows potential for meaningful substantive
protection of Indian religious freedom at sacred sites. It suggests
that when agencies burden Indian religious practices through land
use decisions, such actions will be subject to RFRA scrutiny and
minor gestures of accommodation will not get the government off
the hook. This is a welcome improvement over Lyng and an
important corollary to Bear Lodge. It also makes some headway,
albeit indirect, on the sometimes empty nature of NHPA's
consultation requirement. While agreeing that NHPA does not
require the Forest Service to implement anything it learns during
the consultation process, the court's holding makes it clear that
the Forest Service cannot disregard Indian religious needs to the
point of imposing a substantial burden under RFRA.
Following the Ninth Circuit's panel decision, the federal
government requested, and was granted, rehearing by the en banc
court.' As the case proceeds, a significant question will be
whether RFRA applies to federal public lands at all. Some
commentators point to the legislative history suggesting that RFRA
left the Lyng holding in place.'62 However, the statutory language of
158. Id. The Ninth Circuit further found that the Forest Service had violated NEPA
by failing to study the effects of human ingestion of sewage effluent. Id. at 1051. However,
it agreed that the government had .discharged its obligation to consult with the tribes
through several years of written communications, meetings, and opportunities to
comment, under NHPA. Id. at 1055-56.
159. Id. at 1048.
160. Id.
161. See Navajo Nation v. U. S. Forest Serv., 506 F.3d 717, 718 (Oct. 17, 2007) (9th
cir. granting rehearing en banc).
162. Anastasia P. Winslow, Sacred Standards: Honoring The Establishment Clause In
Protecting Native American Sacred Sites, 38 ARIZ. L. REV. 1291, 1315 & nn.198-99 (1996)
("Congress was assured that RFRA would not create a cause of action on behalf of Native
Americans seeking to protect sacred sites. The Senate report stated that RFRA would not
overrule Lyng and that, under Lyng, 'strict scrutiny does not apply to government actions
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RFRA does not contain a public lands exception. And it is difficult
to imagine a principled reason for such an exception, particularly
when RFRA has been held to apply to federally-owned prisons
where the governmental interest in management authority would
seem to be exceedingly high.1
63
D. Synthesizing the Current Sacred Sites Framework
Lyng generally forecloses Free Exercise clause relief to Indians
in cases where government activity on federal lands threatens
religious uses of sacred sites,"' but it leaves the door open for
agency accommodations of religious practices. 65 Bear Lodge tells
agencies how to craft those accommodations. So long as they are
"voluntary" in nature or refrain from causing "actual injury" to
other citizens, sacred site accommodations seem to withstand
Establishment Clause challenges. Navajo Nation begins to set forth
substantive standards for agency accommodations. If agencies try
to mitigate harm to sacred sites, but nonetheless "burden" Indian
exercise of religion, they will be required to meet RFRA's
compelling interest/least restrictive means test.' 66 Reconsidering
this legal framework through a theory of property and peoplehood
reveals several ways in which federal agencies (and Congress if
necessary) should reform the current protection available for
American Indian relationships with sacred sites.
involving only management of internal government affairs or the use of the government's
own property or resources."'); see also Thiry v. Carlson, 78 F.3d 1491 (10th Cir. 1996)
(denying RFRA relief to a Native American couple challenging road construction through
the gravesite of their infant on grounds that RFRA does not alter Lyngstandard).
163. See, e.g., O'Bryan v. Bureau of Prisons, 349 F.3d 399 (7th Cir. 2003) (applying
RFRA to religious freedom claim of federal prisoner at Federal Correctional Institution on
grounds that RFRA may be applied to the internal operation of the national government);
Kikumura v. Hurley, 242 F.3d 950 (10th Cir. 2001) (applying RFRA to religious freedom
claim of federal prisoner at the United States Penitentiary, Administrative Maximum
(Florence ADX), which houses prisoners deemed the most dangerous and in need of the
tightest control).
164. See Charlton H. Bonham, Devils Tower, Rainbow Bridge and the Uphill Battle Facing
Native American Religion on Public Lands, 20 LAW & INEQ. 157, 165 (2002) ("The decision in
Lyng effectively marked the end of Native American attempts to employ the Free Exercise
clause to protect Native American religious sites on public lands.").
165. See Yablon, supra note 33, at 1629 ("In foreclosing judicial protection, the Lyng
court shut off one method of protecting sacred sites, but suggested another, more feasible
method in its place-agency accommodation.").
166. See Navajo Nation v. U.S. Forest Serv., 479 F.3d 1024, 1043 (9th Cir. 2007).
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III. A THEORY OF REAL PROPERTY AND PEOPLEHOOD
"Surely you're not suggesting the [Navajo] plaintiffs use another
mountain. 161
In this section, I propose a theory of "property and
peoplehood" that reflects the relationship that Indians have with
sacred sites and offers a basis for enhanced legal protection of this
relationship.
A. Property and Personhood
Professor MargaretJane Radin changed the way we think about
property when she introduced the idea that some property is
deserving of a high level of legal protection because it expresses
individual "personhood.' 68 If previously we envisioned property as
any thing-whether chattel, land, or intangible-whose value
could be translated into monetary terms, Radin encouraged us to
make a finer set of distinctions. She argued that most individuals
possess certain objects that are "almost part of themselves." 69
Because of this inextricable relationship between the object and
the self, the loss of such property "causes pain that cannot be
relieved by the object's replacement.' ' 70 In Radin's view, items such
as wedding rings, portraits, and heirlooms are "personal" property
distinguishable from "fungible" property that can be replaced or
compensated with money.'
7'
By identifying these aspects of personal property, Radin also
rejected the ideas of "commensurability," "universal
commodification," and "market inalienability" so prevalent in our
legal system.1v2 That is, the value of some things cannot be
translated into a monetary figure, and these things should not be
traded, at least with complete freedom, on the open market. Nor
should they be subjected to government interference, at least not
without special protection. Instead the law should treat these forms
167. INDIANZ.COM, U.S. Argues Against Protecting Sacred Peaks in Arizona, Oct. 7, 2005,
http://www.indianz.com/News/2005/010671.asp (quoting federal district court Judge
Paul Rosenblatt).
168. SeeRadin, supra note 22, at 1013-14.
169. Id. at 959.
170. Id.
171. See id. at 959-61, 986-88.
172. See RADIN, CONTESTED COMMODITIES, supra note 23, at 8-15.
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of property carefully. Putting these "property and personhood"
theories into a legal framework, Radin proposes: (1) some
property rights should be "recognized and preserved as
personal;' 173 (2) personal property rights "should be protected to
some extent against invasion by government and against
cancellation by conflicting fungible property claims of other
people;' ' 174 and (3) fungible property rights "should yield to some
extent in the face of conflicting recognized personhood interests.
,175
Radin has applied her theories to various contemporary issues
such as the alienability of the human body (touching on topics
such as prostitution, organ and tissue sale, surrogate motherhood,
and stem cell research), takings law, and criminal justice. Her view
is that that economic analysis may fail to capture the issues most
pressing to individuals and society as a whole as we evaluate certain
types of property transactions. If a person is considering selling her
kidney out of a desperate need for money, her decision-making
process is unlikely to be meaningfully informed by concepts of
wealth maximization or freedom of contract. From a societal
perspective, we should not focus exclusively on whether the
individual is allowed to sell the kidney, but rather address the
underlying desperation and its causes.
176
Radin proposes that we transcend market-based rhetoric and
instead adopt a concept of "human flourishing."177 That is, the
appropriateness of property exchanges should be evaluated
according to the extent to which they promote the well-being of
people. Under this approach, it is wrong treat certain property,
such as the human body, as either universally alienable or
universally non-alienable. Instead of imposing or lifting a complete
ban on property transactions degrading to personhood
(prostitution, for example), society should address the underlying
social problems (poverty, for example) and adopt regulations that
will promote the wellbeing of people.
Radin's work on real property offers a particularly useful
173. Radin, supra note 22, at 1014.
174. Id. at 1014-15.
175. Id. at 1015.
176. See Radin, Rethinking supra note 26, at 81.
177. Radin, Market-Inalienability, supra note 23, at 1851.
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platform for rethinking Indian interests in the public lands.17 In
her analysis of the Supreme Court's takings jurisprudence, for
example, she critiques the judges (and scholars) who "treat all
property as fungible."'79 This bias undergirds much of takings law,
including the presumption that all real property should be equally
subject to the power of eminent domain with compensation. We
know that there are differences, including non-economic
differences, in the ways that people use their property and how
they experience property loss. As Radin writes, "airplane overflight
noise 'takes' much more from a (hearing) resident than from a
(hearing) proprietor who already operates a noisy manufacturing
business or from a (nonhearing) corporation.' ' 0 Yet the law of
takings makes no distinction between these parties, or their
particular relationship with property, when it comes to
determining just compensation for a taking.
While pervasive, this universal and equal commodification
approach problematically ignores "our abiding tendency to treat
some property as personal."'' Radin would reform takings law by
injecting personhood analysis to create a "hierarchy of rights"
wherein "property that is bound up with individuals in a
normatively appropriate sense would enjoy greater constitutional
solicitude than property conforming more closely to the market
commodity paradigm."'8 2 The current approach of awarding fair
market value to takings plaintiffs remains appropriate primarily for
real property that is fungible to its owner, or easily valued and
compensated in monetary terms. By contrast, real property that is
"important to the freedom, identity, and contextuality of people"'8 3
merits a different level, or even type, of protection against the
government's power of eminent domain. 4
Radin admits that the Constitution does not explicitly provide
for such solicitous treatment for real property that is personal.'5
But she notes that the Constitution similarly fails to mandate the
universal commensurability (or market-alienability) approach that
178. See Radin, The Liberal Conception, supra note 23, at 1679.
179. Id. at 1684-5.
180. Id. at 1689.
181. Id. at 1685.
182. Id. at 1686-87.
183. Id. at 1686.
184. Id. at 1686-87.
185. See id. at 1688.
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characterizes the Supreme Court's takings jurisprudence.
Moreover, she argues that the Constitution's overriding concern
for individual rights must include individual interests in property
essential to the human condition. Thus courts should have latitude
to consider personhood concerns in takings analysis. As I argue
below, I believe courts should enjoy similar latitude in considering
peoplehood concerns in sacred sites cases."8 6
B. From Personhood to Peoplehood
1. Group interests in property.
While Radin's primary concern is about the relationship
between property and the individual person, I am primarily
focused on the relationship between property and certain groups,
which I define below as "peoples." Radin herself offers a
springboard for this analysis in a brief discussion of group claims
to "personhood" interests in property. Radin's primary example is
the Supreme Court case of Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas, in which
six students living together contested a nuclear-family zoning rule
on the theory that the regulation impinged their rights of
association.8 7 The families responded that their own freedom of
association promoted their interests in the nuclear family.'
Radin finds this case challenging because our legal system
"lacks a convincing theory of group rights," and because
personhood interests can be found on both sides. Neither claim is
particularly strong, however, because the students had not lived in
the community long enough to establish deep "roots" and the
families had "ample opportunities in our culture to reinforce and
express" their traditional family lifestyle.
8 9
Though Village of Belle Terre does not ultimately provide a
satisfactory example of group claims to personhood, Radin leaves
the door open for a "minority group or some group outside the
mainstream of American culture, [whose] claims would seem
stronger because more clearly necessary to their being able to
186. Cf Dan Gildon, Location, Location, Location: Forest Service Administration of the
Recreation Residence Program, 28 ECOLOGY L.Q. 993, 1014-17 (2002) (applying Radin's
"personhood" theory to a certain category of "permit holders" on the public lands).
187. Radin, supra note 22, at 1012 (describing Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas, 416
U.S. 1 (1974)).
188. Id.
189. Id. at 1013.
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constitute themselves as a group and hence as persons within that
group."190
Yet, even though she allows for the possibility of group rights to
property, Radin's work ultimately focuses on the individual. She
contends that the group is like the "home" and other external
"contexts" that further self-individuation. 9' These are places where
we develop the characteristics and aspirations that define us as
individual people.
I am, by contrast, primarily concerned with group's collective
interests in property.9 ' The need for theoretical and practical work
along these lines is demonstrated by the sacred sited jurisprudence
described above. The First Amendment protects individual
religious belief from governmental interference. But traditional
American Indian religions are not typically about individual
belief 9 (or, as Radin might put it, "personal individuation").194 As
Vine Deloria said, "[t]here is no salvation in tribal religions apart
from the continuance of the tribe itself."'95 And the continuance of
the tribe itself often requires ongoing access to sacred sites for
spiritual activities.'96 Thus tribes need a legal theory that will
190. Id.
191. See RADIN, CONTESTED COMMODITIES, supra note 23, at 56.
192. For scholarship considering Radin's property and personhood theory in group
claims to "cultural property," see Madhavi Sunder, Property in Personhood, in RETHINKING
COMMODIFICATION: CASES AND READINGS IN LAW AND CULTURE 164 (Martha M. Ertman &
Joan C. Williams eds., 2005) (applying property and personhood theory to claims of
"subordinated groups" for intellectual property rights to songs, folklore, agricultural
knowledge, and religious symbols);John Moustakas, Note, Group Rights in Cultural Property:
Justifying Strict Inalienability, 74 CORNELL L. REv. 1179 (1989) (using Radin's work to
develop a "[cultural] property for grouphood" theory in which loss of national artistic
patrimony, linked to group identity, causes pain for dispossessed groups, as in the case of
the Greek Parthenon Marbles held in the British Museum following the spoliation of
Greece); Patty Gerstenblith, Identity and Cultural Property: The Protection of Cultural Property in
the United States, 75 B.U. L. REV. 559, 569-70 (1995) (defining cultural property as tangible
objects and intangible expressions that capture a group's identity). But see Eric K. Posner,
The International Protection of Cultural Property: Some Skeptical Observations, 8 CHI. J. INT'L L.
213, 214-15 (2007) (challenging the notion that cultural property is "distinctive or special
and therefore different from ordinary property").
193. See Kristen A. Carpenter, Considering Individual Freedoms Under Tribal
Constitutional Law, 14 KAN.J.L. & PUB. POLY 561, 571-73 (2005).
194. Cf RADIN, CONTESTED COMMODITIES, supra note 23, at 56.
195. See VINE DELORIAJR., GOD IS RED: A NATIVE VIEW OF RELIGION 194 (1992).
196. See Navajo Nation v. U.S. Forest Serv., 479 F.3d 1024, 1034 (9th Cir. 2007).
('The Hopi believe that pleasing the Katsinam on the [San Francisco] Peaks is crucial to
their livelihood. Appearing in the form of clouds, the Katsinam are responsible for
bringing rain to the Hopi villages from the Peaks. The Katsinam must be treated with
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express how their survival depends, in part, on protection for tribal
relationships with sacred sites.
Of course the "glaring omission of groups from dominant legal
theory" (as Avi Soifer has put it) is not just a problem for American
Indians. 9 7 Even in the relatively narrow context of sacred sites
cases, other groups clamor for a voice. Non-Indian religious
communities, citizens of local towns, and recreation groups
complain that they too are disenfranchised in the legal
proceedings surrounding sacred sites.'98 Thus we need a better way
to include groups in the sacred sites process-and as a first step,
we probably need a better way of conceptualizing these groups in
terms of their legal interests. And while the remainder of this
Article will focus on such group interests in the sacred sites
context, developing a coherent way to talk about collective
interests in land may have broad implications in our pluralistic
society.
2. Conceptualizing peoples and peoplehood.
Following the lead of political theorists, I propose using the
terminology of peoples and peoplehood to identify group interests
that have a role to play in contemporary law and policy. In
common parlance, the term "people" connotes a collective
association of individuals based on political affiliation, religion,
culture, language, or other factors.'99 This broad definition
suggests national groups like the American, Iraqi, or Israeli people.
It also includes subnational groups like the Mormon, Orthodox
Jewish, or Navajo people within the United States; the Sunni,
Shiite, or Kurdish people in Iraq; and the Jewish or Arab people in
Israel.
Beyond these common meanings of the terms, scholars
advance several definitions of peoples and peoplehood. Rogers
Smith defines "a political people" as a group that is "a potential
adversary of other forms of human association, because its
proponents.., assert that its obligations legitimately trump many
respect, lest they refuse to bring the rains from the Peaks to nourish the corn crop.").
197. See SOWER, supra note 3, at 1.
198. See generally William Perry Pendley, The Establishment Clause and the Closure of
"Sacred" Public and Private Lands, 83 DENY. U. L. REv. 1023 (2006) (discussing non-Indian
opposition to sacred sites accommodations).
199. MERRIAM-WEBSTER'S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY860 (10th ed. 1993).
[Vol. 27:313
REAL PROPERTY AND PEOPLEHOOD
of the demands made on its members in the name of other
associations."211 Peoples may be constituted along national,
religious, cultural, ethnic, racial, or other lines. Smith recognizes
the following as examples of peoples: China, the United States,
Belgium, the Navajos, Puerto Rico, Ecovillages, Quebec, Wales,
Antioquia, Brooklyn, Hong Kong, Jehovah's Witnesses, the AFL-
CIO, Greenpeace, and OXfam.
20 1
Under Smith's model, some groups or associations are not
peoples at all. The political nature of his model excludes, for
example, "football clubs, singing groups, and Girl Scout troops.""20
Although members might feel "great loyalty" to such groups,
"neither the leaders nor members of such associations are ever
likely to assert seriously that the obligations of those memberships
justify them in violating governmental laws.
20 3
As the Article will argue below, Indian tribes meet Smith's strict
definition of political peoples and in this way, they are distinct
from other groups in the United States. Tribes, like the federal
and state governments, are political "sovereigns." ' 4  Federal
decision-makers must recognize the special status of Indians under
the Constitution, treaties, and trust relationship.2 5 Yet, as a matter
of good administrative policy, I will ultimately call for the broad
inclusion of all groups that have a legitimate stake in the land
management process and also self-identify as peoples, even those
that may lack political autonomy. 206 Ethnic, cultural, and religious
peoples may have important roles to play in the land management
process, even if they are not ultimately empowered to bring claims
200. See SMITH, supra note 48, at 20.
201. Id. at 21.
202. Id. at 20.
203. Id. My article does not focus on the extent to which peoplehood causes groups
to violate property laws, but other scholars have persuasively identified individual and
collective examples of property law-breaking as dynamic means of transforming systematic
entitlements and pursuing justice for "have-nots." See Eduardo Moises Penalver & Sonia K.
Katyal, Property Outlaws, 155 U. PENN. L. REv. 1095 (2007).
204. Sandra Day O'Connor, Lessons from the Third Sovereign: Indian Tribal Courts, 33
TULSA L. J. 1, 1 (1997) ("Today, in the United States, we have three types of sovereign
entities-the Federal government, the States, and the Indian tribes.").
205. See Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1, 10 (1831) ("The condition
of the Indians in relation to the United States is perhaps unlike that of any other two
people in existence .... marked by peculiar and cardinal distinctions which exist nowhere
else.").
206. See infra Part IV (discussing the implementation of property and peoplehood
theory in the administrative process).
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as legal sovereigns.
C. American Indian Peoplehood
Much in the way that Radin's discussion of "personhood"
invokes what is most essential to the individual human condition,
"peoplehood" refers to the qualities that define a group and
inspire individuals to participate in the collective. In common
parlance, peoplehood is the state of being a people or the sense of
belonging to a people."0 7 A more nuanced definition is offered by
Professor John Lie who identifies peoplehood as "an inclusionary
and involuntary group identity with a putatively shared history and
distinct way of life."2 8 Peoplehood is a shared consciousness and
commitment to a group characterized by "common descent-a
shared genealogy or geography" as well as "contemporary
commonality, such as language, religion, culture, or
consciousness.""2 9 It is a sense of peoplehood that prompts people
to identify as American or Arab or Navajo and to comport their
lives according to the values and behaviors of those peoples. This
collective sense of identity, belonging, and participation will be
explicated in the specific context of American Indian peoplehood.
Tribes have long viewed themselves in terms akin to "peoples"
and "peoplehood." In the Cherokee language, for example, one of
the terms used internally to reference Cherokees is "aniyunwiya,"
which translates literally as "people" and figuratively as "the
principal people.""21 In external relations, tribes historically viewed
themselves as entities capable of entering into diplomatic
relationships with one another long before the arrival of
Europeans.' That is, tribes related to one another as distinct,
political, and collective "peoples." For example, early treaties and
agreements exist among the Oneidas, Onondagas, Mohawks,
Senecas, and Cayugas, the affiliated tribes of the Iroquois
Confederacy. 12 Today, too, American Indians continue to affiliate
along tribal lines-as members of the Cherokee Nation, Hopi
207. See WEBSTER'S NINTH NEW COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 871 (1989).
208. See LIE, supra note 48, at 1.
209. Id.
210. See PRENTICE ROBINSON, EASYTO USE CHEROKEE DICTIONARY (1996).
211. See ROBERT A. WILLIAMS, JR., LINKING ARMS TOGETHER: AMERICAN INDIAN
TREATY VISIONS OF LAW & PEACE 1600-1800, 40-82 (1997).
212. See id.
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Tribe, or Acoma Pueblo. Therefore their sense of "peoplehood" is
usually expressed in those tribal-specific terms rather than in the
more general sense of being "Indian."2 '
Tribes' self-identification as peoples corresponds with their
status under the body of Federal Indian Law. Treatment of Indians
as separate political peoples dates back to European conquest and
the treatment of Indians as "nations" With the capacity to enter
treaties as a matter of international law.214 After the Revolutionary
War, the United States stepped into the shoes of its predecessors
and continued to interact with Indian tribes as separate polities.
Within the new constitutional scheme, Indian tribes were
determined to be "domestic dependent nations" rather than
foreign states or states of the union.2"5 These nations within the
nation retain political sovereignty over their land base and
citizenry, subject only to the power of Congress to abrogate these
reserved rights of self-governance.216  As a matter of their
dependency, tribes were held to have lost rights to enter into
treaties with foreign nations and alienate their property to any
entity or person other than the federal government. 17
Even though the Supreme Court continues to limit tribal
sovereignty today, American Indian peoplehood still includes
sovereignty over its members and territory, and a government-to-
government relationship with the United States.21 As the Supreme
Court has held, Indian tribes are "'a separate people' possessing
'the power of regulating their internal and social relations."'2 9 This
213. See generally EVA MARIE GARROUTE, REAL INDIANS: IDENTITY AND THE SURVIVAL
OF NATIVE AMERICA (2003). Cf HAZEL W. HERTZBERG, THE SEARCH FOR AN AMERICAN
INDIAN IDENTITY: MODERN PAN-INDIAN MOVEMENTS (1982) (discussing modern pan-
Indian identity).
214. See Philip P. Frickey, Domesticating Federal Indian Law, 81 MINN. L. REV. 31, 52-74
(1996) (discussing the historical treatment of Indian nations under international law).
215. Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1, 10 (1831). See generally Hope M.
Babcock, A Civic-Republican Vision of "Domestic Dependent Nations" in the Twenty-First Century:
Tribal Sovereignty Re-Envisioned, Reinvigorated, and Re-Empowered, 2005 UTAH L. REV. 443
(discussing the contemporary meaning of Indian nations' historically-delineated legal
status).
216. United States v. Mazurie, 419 U.S. 544, 557 (1975) ("Indian tribes are unique
aggregations possessing attributes of sovereignty over both their members and their
territory ...").
217. Johnson v. McIntosh, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543, 573 (1823).
218. See generally Sarah Krakoff, The Virtues and Vices of Sovereignty, 38 CONN. L. REV.
797 (2006) (describing the contours of tribal sovereignty).
219. Mazurie, 419 U.S. 544, 557.
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political status also has contemporary ramifications for the tribes'
external relations. Like the groups Smith defines as "peoples,"
American Indians quite often find themselves at odds with other
associations, most notably states and the federal government, as a
result of their obligations to the Indian tribe. This singularity is
illustrated by Congress's enactment of a voluminous body of law
"singling [Indians] out for special treatment" in a way that would
otherwise be unconstitutional under the strict scrutiny standard."'
Indian tribes also manifest non-political traits commonly
attributed to peoples. Each tribe typically maintains its own
religion, culture, and language, though they often share traditions
with other tribes in a geographic or linguistic region. Though
these are dynamic, continually changing elements of peoplehood,
most tribes trace their current religion, culture, and language to
pre-contact times. Reflecting the historical depth of Indian
identity, as well as Indian people's connection to a land base,
Anaya offers the following specialized definition of "indigenous
peoples":22'
They are indigenous because their ancestral roots are embedded
in the lands in which they live, or would like to live, much more
deeply than the roots of more powerful sectors of society living
on the same lands or in close proximity. Furthermore, they are
peoples to the extent they comprise distinct communities with a
continuity of existence and identity that links them to the
communities, tribes, or nations of their ancestral past.
2
1
American Indian Studies scholar Tom Holm postulates four
attributes of peoplehood that have ensured the survival of Indian
tribes during periods of conquest, colonization, and forced
assimilation. These comprise: (1) maintaining language, (2)
understanding place, (3) keeping particular religious ceremonies
alive, and (4) perpetuating a sacred history. Though he does not
explicitly include it in his matrix, Holm also writes extensively
220. Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535, 552 (1974) ("Literally every piece of
legislation dealing with Indian tribes and reservations . . . single[s] out for special
treatment a constituency of tribal Indians living on or near reservations. If these laws...
were deemed invidious racial discrimination, an entire Title of the United States Code (25
U.S.C.) would be effectively erased.. ").
221. See S.JAMES ANAYA, INDIGENOUS PEOPLES IN INTERNATIONAL LAw 100-06 (2004).
222. Id. at 3.
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about a fifth element essential to American Indian peoplehood:
retaining rights as political sovereigns.2
In the final analysis, all of these attempts to define Indian
peoplehood may be truly academic, because "indigenous peoples
have insisted on the right to define themselves."2" Yet, it may be
helpful for advocates to link tribal interests in property to
"recognized indicia of ipeoplelhood. , 25 Applying Holm's model
suggests that sacred sites are deeply related to American Indian
peoplehood 26 Though dozens of examples are available, I will
discuss two that are particularly relevant to this Article-the Navajo
and Hopi relationships with San Francisco Peaks, the sacred site at
issue in the Navajo Nation case.
The relationship between tribal languages, religions, and
peoplehood is an intimate one.227 Various prayers, songs, and
healing ceremonies can only be performed in the indigenous
tongue and the survival of tribal religions depends on passing the
language down to future generations.228 As tribes revitalize their
ciltures and communities, language and religion are mutually
reinforcing aspects of tribal worldviews and ritual practices. Sacred
places are known to the tribal community by indigenous names
that carry with them an entire set of meanings, instructions, and
values.229 In the Navajo language, the San Francisco Peaks are
223. TOM HOLM, THE GREAT CONFUSION IN INDIAN AFFAIRS: NATIVE AMERICANS &
WHITES IN THE PROGRESSIVE ERA xiv, xvii (2005).
224. See Robert A. Williams, Jr., Encounters on the Frontiers of International Human Rights
Law: Redefining the Terms of Indigenous Peoples' Survival in the World, 1990 DUKE L.J. 660, 663
& n.4.
225. See Radin, supra note 22, at 979 (identifying property theories that link
stronger property claims to recognized indicia of personhood").
226. See Rebecca Davis, Opportunistic Hate Crimes Targeting Symbolic Property: When Free
Speech Is Not Free, 10J. GENDER RACE &JUST. 93, 103 (2006) (arguing that religious symbols
representative of group identity are associated with personhood to the degree that
destruction of them "constitutes, at some level, a death of a part of the victim").
227. See, e.g., Mark A. Michaels, Indigenous Ethics and Alien Laws: Native Traditions and
the United States Legal System, 66 FORDHAM L. REV. 1565, 1571 (1998) ("Because Native
religions depend on the oral tradition for their transmission, the death of a language often
means the death of a religion. Stories and ceremonies are at the core of most, if not all,
Native religions, and these stories and ceremonies lose their context and meaning when
translated.").
228. See WILMA MANKILLER, EVERY DAY IS A GOOD DAY: REFLECTIONS BY
CONTEMPORARY INDIGENOUS WOMEN 37 (2004) ("You have to be able to speak Cherokee
to be a Cherokee medicine person. How can you say the right words if you can't speak
Cherokee?" (quoting Florence Soap)).
229. Cf MERON BENVENISTI, SACRED LANDSCAPE: THE BURIED HISTORY OF THE HOLY
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"Doko'oo'sliid", or "Shining on Top." Home of the Sacred Abalone
Shell Woman, Doko'oo'sliid is a name that reflects the Peaks snow-
covered appearance and their role in sustaining Navajo life.230
When it comes to understanding place, the San Francisco
Peaks plays an important role in Navajo peoplehood. The Peaks
are one of four mountains marking Dinetah, the sacred Navajo
homeland which is itself is a sacred concept. From the time of
their creation, the Navajo people have had a spiritual obligation to
stay within their homeland, care for it, and revere their sacred
mountains. Accordingly, the Peaks are greeted with daily prayer
songs referencing the mountain as "mother" and "leader., 231' The
Navajo writer Luci Tapahonso said that the four mountains-
Blanca Peak, Mount Taylor, Hesperus Peak, the San Francisco
Peaks-"were given to us to live by.... These mountains and the
land keep us strong. From them, and because of them, we prosper.




The San Francisco Peaks are integral to keeping alive a number
of religious ceremonies and an entire ceremonial way of life. 33
Navajo families keep bundles with elements collected from the
four sacred mountains and use these in prayers directed toward
the Peaks.234 Some medicine men conduct pilgrimages, gathering
plants from the Peaks and relying on their purity for medicinal
purposes.235 They use these medicines in Blessingway and other
healing ceremonies. 236 These ceremonies link the spiritual and
LAND SINCE 1948 (2000) (chronicling the journey of the son of an Israeli cartographer
who literally "remapped" Palestine, replacing Palestinian villages and site with Israeli
names, as part of the process of transforming an Arab landscape into an Israeli state).
230. See S.J. Wilson, Sacred Mountain Prayer Run a Prayer for the Sacred, NEWS FROM
INDIAN COUNTRY, June 25, 2007, http://indiancountrynews.net/index.php?option
=comcontent&task=view&id=695&Itemid (reporting on Navajo Sam Tso explaining that
Doko'oo'sliid in Navajo philosophy means the breath of life, of good thoughts).
231. Navajo Nation v. U.S. Forest Serv., 479 F.3d 1024, 1035 (9th Cir. 2007). The use
of these terms reflects the "personification" of Indian sacred sites. See also VINE DELORIA
JR., FOR THIS LAND: WRITINGS ON RELIGION IN AMERICA 131 (1999) ("[T]he essence of the
Indian attitude toward peoples, lands, and other life forms is one of kinship relations in
which no element of life can go unattached from human society. Thus lands are given
special status because they form a motherhood relationship with the peoples who live on
them.").
232. LUCI TAPAHONSO, BLUE HORSES RUSH IN: POEMS & STORIES 42 (1997).
233. Navajo Nation, 479 F.3d at 1035-36.
234. Id.
235. Id.
236. Id. at 1036.
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physical health of Navajo people directly to the Peaks.
For Navajo people, the Peaks reflect sacred histories, both
ancient and modern. The mountain connects Navajos with their
very origins. 8 In the Navajo creation story, the first woman,
Changing Woman, lived on the Peaks and experienced her
kinaalda coming-of-age ceremony there.239 She then gave birth to
twins who are ancestors of the Navajo people, and young Navajo
women continue to celebrate their own kinaalda ceremonies
today.240 In modern historical times, the federal government
forcefully relocated the Navajos from their homeland to a prison
camp at Bosque Redondo. 24' The four year ordeal, stretching from
1864 to 1868, became known as the "Long Walk," a defining time
in Navajo history. During the Long Walk, the Navajo suffered
physical and emotional harms, longing to return to the traditional
homeland cradled by the San Francisco Peaks and the other three
sacred mountains.242
The Long Walk period reflects the importance of the Peaks to
Navajo sovereignty. The Navajos' attachment to their sacred lands
was one of the main factors inspiring their political resistance to
the federal government's relocation practice.24  The Navajos
prevailed (to some extent) and in 1868 negotiated a treaty
restoring their rights to occupy, govern, and live as Navajos on a
reservation within their traditional territory.244 As elder Frank
Goldtooth explained, "We now live within our four great sacred
mountains, where our... Holy People want us to live, but most of
the mountains themselves were taken away from us by the white
237. Id. at 1035-36.
238. See PAUL ZOLBROD, DINE BAHANE: THE NAVAJO CREATION STORY 23 (1991)
(arguing that references to San Francisco Peaks in Navajo creation story were "proof that it
would be sacrilegious" to expand ski facilities).
239. Navajo Nation, 479 F.3d at 1035.
240. See id.
241. See generally RUTH ROESSEL, NAVAJO STORIES OF THE LONG WALK PERIOD (1973).
242. See id. at 40-41 (quoting Navajo elder Howard W. Gorman). To the extent that
many sacred sites are identified in tribal origin stories and form a crucial part of the tribe's
"homeland," an interesting project might be to conceptualize sacred sites as "homes" for
tribal cultures. As a number of scholars have noted, our legal system offers solicitous
treatment of homes, and people's related interests in security, privacy, and liberty. See, e.g.,
D. Benjamin Barros, Home as a Legal Concept, 46 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 255 (2006).
243. ROESSEL, supra note 241, at 153 (quoting Navajo elder Frank Goldtooth).
244. Treaty Between the United States of America and the Navajo Tribe of Indians,
U.S.-Navajo,June 1, 1868, 15 Stat. 667.
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people. '245 Today, Navajos maintain a separate government, land
base, religious and cultural traditions, and language-and some
continue to live in sight of the Peaks.246 As one Navajo man
explained, San Francisco Peaks "is where the Holy Ones emerged
to this world. The soil guides our people, it affects how we treat
them, it's how we treat ourselves. 247 The tribe's relationship with
San Francisco Peaks or Doko'oo'sliid-maintained against many
governmental attempts to sever it-is a formative element of
Navajo peoplehood.248
For the Hopi people, the Peaks are known as Nuvatukaovi or
'the place of snow on the very top" and they are the center of Hopi
religious life.249 After emerging into this world, the Hopi clans
journeyed to the Peaks and entered into a spiritual covenant with
Ma'saw, a spiritual presence that directed them to care for the
land.25 Today, too, "the Peaks are the place where the Hopi direct
their prayers and thoughts, a point in the physical world that
defines the Hopi universe and serves as home to the Katsinam
[popularly known as "kachinas" in English], who bring water,
snow, and life to the Hopi people. 25 ' These are not abstract
sentiments for the Hopi people, but are rather infused in Hopi
life. Water and fir branches gathered from the Peaks are used in
ceremonies to welcome visiting Katsinam when they migrate to the
Hopi mesas in early spring.252 The Katsinam stay through the corn
planting season, bringing water to the crops, and then return to
the Peaks in July.29 ' Hopi people show respect to the Peaks by
maintaining numerous shrines there, conducting pilgrimages to
the Peaks, praying toward the Peaks, and singing songs focused on
them.254 These practices reflect the Hopi ceremonial and planting
245. See ROESSEL, supra note 241, at 153 (quoting Navajo elder Frank Goldtooth).
246. See, e.g., Wilson, supra note 230 (describing a Navajo activist who "lives within
the ancestral boundaries of the Navajo, within sight of Dokooo'sliiat').
247. See Sararesa Begay, Navajos, Hopis Speak Against Snowbowl Plan, NAVAJO TIMES,
Dec. 12, 2002, available at http://www.nathpo.com/News/SacredSites/News-
SacredSites42.htm (quoting Navajo Adair Klopfestein).
248. BETWEEN SACRED MOUNTAINS: NAVAJO STORIES AND LESSONS FROM THE LAND 2
(Sam Bingham et al. eds., 1982) (situating Navajo life between the four sacred mountains).
249. Navajo Nation v. U.S. Forest Serv., 479 F.3d 1024, 1034 (9th Cir. 2007).
250. See id.
251. Navajo Nation v. U.S. Forest Serv., 479 F.3d 1024 (9th Cir. 2007).
252. Id. at 1035.
253. Id. at 1034.
254. See id.
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cycles, Hopi values and responsibilities, and Hopi reliance on rain
and corn for survival.255
The Navajo and Hopi experiences with San Francisco Peaks
suggest that tribal relationships with sacred sites are essential to
Indians' ability to survive as "peoples."
D. Peoplehood as a Norm.ative Concret
If we can accept that Indians are peoples and sacred sites are
integral to Indian peoplehood, there remains the question of why
protecting peoples and peoplehood is a good idea. In his
important work, The Law of Peoples, John Rawls articulates several
reasons for analyzing the interests of "peoples. ' 256 These boil down
to his view that contemporary liberal society is comprised of
various political groups, each of which must recognize the others
as legitimate-even if their values differ within acceptable limits of
liberalism and decency-in order to effectuate just democratic
ideals. 57
Rawls' goal is to develop principles for the operation of a 'just
democratic society. 2 5' This task, he argues, is best informed by a
focus on "peoples" and analysis of the extent to which they meet
democratic ideals and practices.259 In Rawls' vision of a "realistic
utopia ' there exist "liberal [democratic] peoples" who have "a
reasonably just constitutional democratic government that serves
their fundamental interests; citizens united by . . . common
sympathies; and finally, a moral nature." '61 In addition to "liberal
peoples," there may also be "decent peoples" whose ideals and
practices do not meet the standard of liberal democracies but are
nonetheless welcomed into the society of peoples because they are
non-aggressive entities, ultimately pursuing peace through
legitimate means and because they extend human rights to their
members.262
Such liberal (or decent) peoples pursue several legitimate
255. See id. at 1034-35.
256. See RAWLS, supra note 49, at 12.
257. See id.
258. Id. at 26.
259. Id. at 27.
260. Id. at 16.
261. Id. at 23.
262. Id. at 65.
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interests: "[t]hey seek to protect their territory, to ensure the
security and safety of their citizens, and to preserve their free
political institutions and the liberties and free culture of their civil
society., 26 In Rawls' realistic utopia, peoples accord one another
"respect and recognition to other peoples as equals."2" Though
there may be inequalities between peoples, they practice a
relationship of "reciprocity" involving cooperation, mutual
acceptance, and adherence to the Law of Peoples.265
Federal law already recognizes that the legal protection of
American Indian peoplehood is crucial to the operation of a just,
democratic society. Historically, the United States signed treaties
with Indian nations that recognized their existence, territorial
sovereignty, and ongoing right to exist as political entities.2 66 A
foundational principle of federal Indian law is that the United
States has an obligation to protect Indian tribes against other
governments and individuals.67 In its common law sense, this "trust
responsibility" embodies the national obligation to exercise the
highest duty of care for Indian tribes.2" The federal government
also has numerous specific statutory duties to care for Indian
health, education, child welfare, cultural patrimony, natural
resources, economic development, language retention, lands, and
religious freedom-many of the aspects comprising tribal
peoplehood.269
The United States' treatment of Indian nations is primarily
important as a matter of Indian wellbeing and survival. Many tribes
continue to suffer challenges of recovering from conquest and
colonization, and thus rely on the nation's long-standing promises
to support their communities. Secondarily, the United States'
263. Id. at 29.
264. Id. at 35.
265. Id.
266. See generally INDIAN TREATIES 1778-1883 (Charles J. Kappler ed., 1996); VINE
DELORIA JR., BEHIND THE TRAIL OF BROKEN TREATIES: AN INDIAN DECLARATION OF
INDEPENDENCE (1974); VINE DELORIA JR. & DAVID E. WILKINS, TRIBES, TREATIES, AND
CONSTITUTIONAL TRIBULATIONS (1999).
267. See Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1, 16 (1831).
268. Seminole Nation v. United States, 316 U.S. 286, 296-97 (1942) (maintaining
that in establishing a treaty with the Indians the government has charged itself with the
"moral obligations of the highest responsibility and trust," and that its conduct should
therefore be judged by "the most exacting fiduciary standards").
269. See NELL NEWTON ET AL., COHEN'S HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW, ch. 22
(2005).
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treatment of Indian nations offers an important diagnostic test of
the country's democratic ideals. As Felix Cohen, the founding
father of Federal Indian Law,270 famously said:
The Indian plays much the same role in our American society
that the Jews played in Germany. Like the miner's canary, the
Indian marks the shift from fresh air to poison gas in our political
atmosphere; and our treatment of Indians, even more than our
treatment of other minorities, reflects the rise and fall of our
democratic faith.271
This statement echoes Rawls propositions about the role of
peoples in just democratic societies. A society's treatment of other
peoples, particularly disempowered peoples, reflects that society's
commitment to the rule of law, freedom, and democracy itself.
Thus, it is for the sake both of Indian tribes and American society
itself that the law should operate to protect Indian peoples.
Unfortunately, when federal policy threatens Indian interests in
sacred sites, it also threatens the wellbeing and survival of Indian
peoples, and fails to advance our best democratic ideals.
E. Democratic Ideals at Sacred Sites
Sacred sites disputes present an opportunity to advance the
democratic ideals of our nation by recognizing and addressing the
interests of peoples with interests in those sites. The seeds of
justice, decency, and morality already exist in our federal land use
law and policy, as I will describe in greater detail below. But our
Supreme Court has stymied realization of these democratic ideals
at sacred sites. The Lyng case perpetuates the outmoded idea that
the federal government is the only party that ultimately matters in
sacred sites analysis, because it wields both political sovereignty
and property ownership over the public lands, and such power is
not limited by the First Amendment's protections for religious
belief.27 ' This approach obviates consideration of the interests of
270. See Philip P. Frickey, Transcending Transcendental Nonsense: Toward a New Realism
in Federal Indian Law, 38 CONN. L. REV. 649, 649-50 (2006) (discussing the centrality of
Cohen's work to the field); see also DALIA TSUK MITCHELL, ARCHITECT OFJUSTICE: FELIX S.
COHEN AND THE FOUNDING OF AMERICAN LEGAL PLURALISM (2007).
271. FELIX S. COHEN'S HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW v (Rennard Strickland, et
al. eds., 1982).
272. SeeLyng v. Nw. Indian Cemetery Protective Ass'n, 485 U.S. 439, 453 (1988).
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"peoples," focusing exclusively on the power of the state vis t vis
individuals.
Beyond the general observation that Lyng obviates the
concerns of peoples, Rawls' framework has even more specific
implications for sacred sites disputes. The Law of Peoples sets forth
two norms with relevance to the sacred sites discussion - these
include respect for other peoples' territorial boundaries and
reasonable religious pluralism.273 On the first point, liberal or
decent peoples "cannot make up for their irresponsibility in caring
for their land and its natural resources by conquest in war or by
migrating into other people's territory without their consent.
274
Moreover, a fundamental principle of liberal democracy is
"reasonable pluralism."275 That is, free democratic institutions, by
their very nature, allow the development of conflicting doctrines,
both religious and secular. 76 By extending mutual respect and
cooperation, peoples can tolerate one another's religions, even if
they do not espouse the same worldview.277 This is the only way to
ensure that all citizens enjoy freedom of conscience and
worldview. 78
Unfortunately, the current state of federal sacred sites policy
perpetuates the United States' historical failings to respect Indian
peoples' territory and religions. Justice O'Connor seemed to
trumpet these failings when she wrote in Lyng. "Whatever rights
the Indians may have to the use of the area, however, those rights
do not divest the Government of its right to use what is, after all, its
land. 279 In a previous article, I criticized this holding for its
treatment of the government as an owner with near absolute rights
over the public lands. 2"° But Rawls' work suggests still additional
criticisms. These include O'Connor's veiled references to, and
perpetuation of, the history of Indian land dispossession and
religious oppression.
To put it in Rawls' terms, the federal government owns many
273. See RAWLS, supra note 49, at 39, 124.
274. Id. at 39.
275. Id. at 124.
276. See id.
277. See id.
278. See id. at 151.
279. Lyng v. Nw. Indian Cemetery Protective Ass'n, 485 U.S. 439, 453 (1988).
280. See Carpenter, supra note 46, at 1092-93.
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sacred sites only because it violated the Law of Peoples: in many
cases, it either engaged in literal conquest or migrated into Indian
people's territory without their consent.21' Tribes have lost title to
sacred sites through outright conquest,
2 2 forced relocations, 28 3
treaty violations,2 4  allotment of Indian lands,8 5  and other
methods-and federal law has legitimized almost all of these
events as transferring good title.28 6 Often the government created
policies to take Indian lands with the explicit purpose of
destroying the essential connection between tribal cultures and
traditional land bases,2 7 and paving the way for white civilization.88
Even if some land sales by treaty could be described as fair, arms-
length transactions, we are still left with the question of whether
the government's ownership of sacred sites should include the
legal right to destroy them when they remain so important to
Indian peoples.289
281. Cf Johnson v. McIntosh, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543, 589-91 (1823) (holding that
although the Law of Nations recognized the property rights of conquered peoples, that
law was "incapable of application" to American Indians).
282. See Wenona T. Singel & Matthew L.M. Fletcher, Power, Authority, and Tribal
Property, 41 TULSA L. REV. 21, 28-33 (2005) (discussing instances of dispossession of Indian
lands accomplished by government-sanctioned "brute physical force," and offering the
example of a Michigan Odawa cemetery lost through "the mixture of apparent legal
authority and physical power").
283. See, e.g., Sequoyah v. Tenn. Valley Auth., 620 F.2d 1159, 1164 (6th Cir. 1980)
(denying First Amendment claim regarding flooding of Cherokee sacred site, despite
recognition that Cherokees' lack of any property interest in the site "should not be
conclusive in view of the history of the Cherokee expulsion from Southern Appalachia
followed by the Trail of Tears to Oklahoma and the unique nature of the plaintiffs'
religion").
284. United States v. Sioux Nation of Indians, 448 U.S. 371, 409, 416-17 (1980)
(ruling the taking of treaty-guaranteed lands including the sacred Black Hills, in the
absence of a showing of Congressional good faith, compensable under the Fifth
Amendment).
285. See THE NATIVE AMERICANS OF THE SOUTHEAST (Turner Broadcasting System
Films 1992) (discussing tribal "stomp grounds," where ceremonial dances are held, were
lost during allotment period when tribal lands were divided up and tide granted to Indian
and non-Indian individuals).
286. See Singel & Fletcher, supra note 282, at 22, 35 (arguing that the dispossession of
Indian lands was accomplished through "the exercise of legal authority in accordance with
the letter of federal law").
287. See, e.g., President Theodore Roosevelt, Message of the President of the United
States to the First Session of the Fifty-Seventh Congress, 103 Cong. Rec. 1257 (Dec. 3,
1901) ("The General Allotment Act is a mighty pulverizing engine to break up the tribal
mass. It acts directly upon the family and the individual.").
288. SeeBURTON, supra note 47, at 93.
289. Cf Joseph William Singer, After the Hood: Equality and Humanity in Property
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The historical treatment of Indian religious freedoms is equally
troubling. To put this history in Rawlsian terminology: the federal
government's historic intolerance of Indian religions has long
undermined the "fact of reasonable [religious] pluralism" which is
a "basic feature of liberal democracy. '290 In the Nineteenth and
Twentieth centuries the United States government undertook
specific and sustained practices designed to eradicate American
Indian religious practices. 2 1 These included United States Army
massacres of people engaged in religious dances, federal laws
criminalizing Indian religious practices, federally funded programs
assigning Christian missionaries to reservations, the removal of
Indian children from their families to Christian boarding schools,
and other programs tied closely to the federal project assimilating
American Indians.92 Congress officially repudiated the federal
assimilation policy in 1934 but many of its ramifications for Indian
religious freedoms have been difficult to remedy.
It is difficult to read Lyng without hearing echoes of these
earlier policies. Lyng could be read to hold that, although there is
no longer a government-wide policy of converting Indians to
Christianity, the First Amendment only protects Indians who
worship in what Justice Brennan calls a "Western" religious
tradition based on an individual belief system.2 93 And though there
is no longer a government-wide policy of destroying Indian
religions, agencies can carry out this practice so long as it occurs
Regimes, 52 LOY. L. REV. 243, 295 (2006) ("The question is whether an owner can claim to
be entitled to exercise that much power over other human beings. Even if one thinks the
process by which someone acquired property was just because it followed from a series of
voluntary transactions, a resulting imbalance in the distribution of property may create a
form of social life that gives some people the power to rule over others.").
290. SeeRAWLS, supranote 49, at 124, 149.
291. See generally John Rhodes, An American Tradition: The Religious Persecution of Native
Americans, 52 MONT. L. REV. 13 (1991).
292. See generally Allison M. Dussias, Ghost Dance and Holy Ghost: The Echoes of
Nineteenth-Century Christianization Policy in Twentieth-Century Native American Free Exercise
Cases, 49 STAN. L. REv. 773, 787-805 (1997) (recounting various acts by federal government
and religious institutions, often acting together, that suppressed Indian religions).
293. See Lyng v. Nw. Indian Cemetery Protective Ass'n, 485 U.S. 439, 460-66 (1988)
(Brennan,J., dissenting) (distinguishing between protected Western religions based on an
individual belief system and unprotected indigenous religious based on land use); see also
BURTON, supra note 47, at 293 (arguing that in Lyng and Smith, "the anti-pluralist majority
[of the Supreme Court] regularly accords indigenous beliefs a constitutional status far
inferior to that of established Euro-American religions").
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pursuant to their land management authority.24 These holdings
are problematic beyond the facts of Lyng. As Rawls put it, even if
various religious groups "might prefer that the others not exist, the
plurality of sects is the greatest assurance each has of its own equal
liberty."295 By legitimizing the destruction of an Indian religion, the
Lyng opinion thus threatens the liberty of other religions and
undermines liberal democratic principles.96
In short, Lyng specifically violates the Law of Peoples by failing
to respect Indian people's territorial boundaries or religious
liberties. While Rawls' regime may be theoretical, it is supported by
positive law. I have highlighted the tendency of our domestic
American law to privilege individual rights. Yet our legal system
recognizes the legal interests of certain collective entities with
cognizable claims to religion and property. Churches representing
congregations assert religion claims under the First Amendment.
Corporations representing shareholders often assert property
claims Fifth Amendment claims.2 197 The Supreme Court treats
corporations as "persons" under the Fourteenth Amendment.29
Among other American groups, Indian tribes seem to be
particularly unsuccessful in asserting religious299 and property9 '
294. See Lyng, 485 U.S. at 476.
295. See RAWLS, supra note 49, at 124. Onondaga leader Oren has said, "[Europeans]
came over here for religious freedom but we know they came over here to occupy lands, to
colonize lands. In their search for religious freedom, we lost ours." THE NATIVE
AMERICANS: THE NATIONS OF THE NORTHEAST (Turner Broadcasting Systems Films 1994).
296. Rawls calls for mutual "toleration" and "reconciliation" of religions but stops
short of "ensur[ing] the spiritual well-being" of peoples. RAWLS, supra note 49, at 126-27. I
would argue that toleration requires protection for Indian sacred sites, but the Lyng
majority seemed to suggest that it only requires the government to refrain from coercing
religious belief. It is not clear where Rawls would come out on this question. Professor
Noah Feldman has considered other religious questions implicating the space between the
First Amendment's Free Exercise and Establishment Clauses. See e.g., FELDMAN, supra note
45 (calling for the accommodation of religious symbols in public spaces but restraint on
government funding of religious organizations).
297. See, e.g., Church of Lukumu Bablu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520
(1993) (discussing a church that brought cognizable Free Exercise claim against city
regulations against ritual slaughter of animals); Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 986
(1984) (holding that an EPA regulation requiring disclosure of confidential company data
would amount to a taking under the Fifth Amendment).
298. See Santa Clara County v. S. Pac. R.R. Co., 118 U.S. 394, 396 (1889) (holding
that corporations are persons deserving protection under the Fourteenth Amendment).
299. See, e.g., L. Scott Smith, From Promised Land to Tower of Babel: Religious Pluralism
and the Future of the Liberal Experiment in America, 45 BRANDEIS L.J. 527, 557-62 (2007)
(discussing religious pluralism) and arguing the Supreme Court generally applies the
liberal position of "neutrality" rather than support for any religious practice, but even
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rights. This is true even though federal common law, statutory law,
and treaties all require the government to protect Indian lands
from the intrusions of states and individuals"0 ' and the American
Indian Religious Freedom Act make its federal policy to "protect
and preserve Indian religions. '0 2 The law would appear to
guarantee Indians protections beyond those set forth in the
Constitution, but the practical reality is that they enjoy less
property and religious freedom than do other American
individuals and groups.3
In international law, there is still more specific support for
applying the Rawlsian principles to indigenous peoples. On
September 13, 2007, after twenty-five years of negotiation, the
United Nations passed the Declaration on the Rights of
Indigenous Peoples explicitly recognizing indigenous groups as
"peoples" under international law and thus entitled to the
Declaration's protection of property, religion, and other interests
against incursions by other peoples and states.304 Even before
passage of the Declaration, numerous instruments and principles
of international law have long provided potential protection for
indigenous interests in off-reservation sacred sites cases. 35 These
include indigenous rights to property, religion, culture,
association, and resources found, for example, in the American
Convention on Human Rights and American Declaration on the
Rights and Duties of Man.00 International human rights law may
within this tradition, Native Americans are "outsiders" for whom "neutrality may be little
more than a mirage").
300. SeeJoseph William Singer, Lone Wolf, or How to Take Property by Calling It a "Mere
Change in the Form of Investment, "38 TULSA L. REv. 37, 44 (2002) (arguing that Indian tribes
are denied compensation under the Fifth Amendment on facts that would support
recovery by individuals or corporations).
301. See NEWTON ET AL., supra note 269, at ch. 15 (on federal protections for tribal
property).
302. See supra note 74 and accompanying text.
303. See Joseph William Singer, Reply, Double Bind: Indian Nations v. The Supreme
Court, 119 HARV. L. REV. F. 1 (2005) (surveying cases in which the Supreme Court denied
to Indians property and sovereignty rights routinely according to non-Indians), available at
http://www.harvardlawreview.org/forum/issues/119/decO5/singer.pdf.
304. See Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous People, U.N. Doc. A/61/L.67
(Sept. 13, 2007).
305. See Carpenter, supra note 46, at 1131-38. See also Robert T. Coulter et al.,
Memorandum, International Human Rights Law Relating to Indigenous Sacred Sites (Oct.
16, 2006), http://www.indianlaw.org/pdf/dpa/bb/Sacred%20sites%20mmo.pdf.
306. See Carpenter, supra note 46, at 1132-33.
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not be strictly enforceable in the United States, which was one of
four countries voting against the Declaration on the Rights of
Indigenous Peoples.0 7 Yet these instruments create expectations
regarding states' treatment of indigenous peoples within their
borders, including administrative agencies' protection of off-
reservation tribal property."'
In t, the United States Supreme Court has found it
constitutional to violate American Indian religious freedoms at
sacred sites,"0 but emerging ideals and principles of domestic and
international law raise the question of whether it is right to do so. l0
IV. IMPLEMENTING REAL PROPERTY AND PEOPLEHOOD
"A (reasonable) Law of Peoples must be acceptable to reasonable peoples
who are . . . diverse; and it must be fair between them and effective in
shaping the larger schemes of their cooperation.
307. Press Release, Sixty-First U.N. Gen. Assembly, General Assembly Adopts
Declaration on Rights of Indigenous Peoples (Sept. 13, 2007), available at
http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2007/ga10612.doc.htm. Of particular relevance to
this Article is the United States' long-standing opposition to use of the term "peoples" in
the Draft Declaration on Indigenous Peoples' Rights. For the United States, the term
problematically connotes an indigenous right of self-determination which the United
States believes it has already recognized through its domestic legislative policy of "self-
determination" and indigenous statehood and secession under international law (which
the United States would oppose). See generally ANAYA, supra note 211, at 100-03. Despite the
United States' resistance to the use of these terms, domestic lawmakers may still have the
power to use international legal norms in their decision-making processes. For scholarship
on this topic, see, for example, Philip P. Frickey, Domesticating Federal Indian Law, 81 MINN.
L. REv. 31, 75-80 (1996); Note, International Law as an Interpretive Force in Federal Indian Law,
116 HARv. L. REv. 1751, 1751-52, 1756 (2003); Kirsten M. Hetzel, Reaching Regional
Consensus: Examining United States Native American Property Rights in Light of Recent
International Developments, 10 TUL.J. INT'L & COMP. L. 307, 327-38 (2002).
308. S. James Anaya & Robert A. Williams, Jr., The Protection of Indigenous Peoples'
Rights over Lands and Natural Resources Under the Inter-American Human Rights System, 14
HARV. HUM. RTS.J. 33, 33 (2001) (reviewing four cases that analyze indigenous land and
resources claims); Lorie M. Graham, The Racial Discourse of Federal Indian Law, 42 TULSA L.
REv. 103, 120 (2006) (debating the applicability of international human rights norms in
cases involving American Indian property rights).
309. See Lyng v. Nw. Indian Cemetery Protective Ass'n, 485 U.S. 439, 477 (1988)
(Brennan,J., dissenting) (maintaining that the Lyngmajority "makes a mockery" of federal
policy in favor of Indian religious freedom and "fails utterly to accord with the dictates of
the First Amendment").
310. See Singer, supra note 20, at 55 ('Conquest is not something that happened in
the distant past which cannot be corrected. Rather, the [Supreme] Court is attempting to
conquer Indian nations now by its failure to protect tribal property rights and inherent
sovereignty.").
311. RAWLS, supra note 49, at 11-12.
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I have argued that certain interests in real property are
expressive of, and integral to, American Indian peoplehood. The
loss of Indian interests in sacred sites causes pain that cannot be
relieved by replacement or monetary compensation; thus these
interests are nonfungible and deserve heightened legal protection.
The question is how such a property and peoplehood approach
would work in practice. Procedurally, federal agencies should
include "peoples" in the federal land management process.
Substantively, federal land managers should try to accommodate
competing uses, but where this proves impossible, they should
prioritize sacred site access and protection over competing uses
(rather than vice versa as in Lyngand many of the other cases).312
To illustrate these contentions in greater detail, this Part
suggests reforms to agency sacred sites practice consistent with a
theory of property and peoplehood. This Part also considers
legislative reform and potential critiques of my property and
peoplehood approach.
A. Improving Administrative Practice
1. Procedure.
I offer three suggestions for improving agency procedures
relative to sacred sites management: (1) Include peoplehood
interests in the initial "statement of purpose" or equivalent
document for land management decisions; (2) tailor the NHPA
"consultation process" to the peoples identified in the statement;
and (3) secure the identified peoples as signatories to the
"memorandum of understanding" required by the NHPA and any
interim or final management plans. Agencies are not presently
required by law to do any of these things, but they may result in
improved practice.313
312. See Lyng v. Nw. Indian Cemetery Protective Ass'n, 485 U.S. 439, 476 (1988)
(Brennan, J., dissenting) (calling Lyng a "ruling [that] sacrifices a religion at least as old as
the Nation itself, along with the spiritual well-being of its approximately 5,000 adherents,
so that the Forest Service can build a 6-mile segment of road that two lower courts found
had only the most marginal and speculative utility, both to the Government itself and to
the private lumber interests that might conceivably use it.").
313. See generally CHRISTOPHER F. EDLEY, JR., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW: RETHINKING
JUDICIAL CONTROL OF BUREAUCRACY (1990) (citing expertise and accountability as
justifications for agency discretion).
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a. Statement of purpose.
When an agency articulates its "statement of purpose" in
reviewing a land management proposal, it should explicitly include
peoplehood interests. This is particularly appropriate where the
sacred site is eligible for protection as a traditional cultural
property (TCP) under the NHPA. A traditional cultural property is
one "associat[ed] with cultural practices or beliefs of a living
community that (a) are rooted in that community's history, and
(b) are important in maintaining the continuing cultural identity
of the community. 3 4 Thus a sacred site's legal designation as a
TCP implicates the relationship between it and a particular
community. It makes sense to manage such properties with
attention to the relevant community or people.
Unfortunately, the Forest Service's statement of purpose in the
Navajo Nation case is an example of ignoring peoplehood concerns
altogether. Though San Francisco Peaks is also a protected TCP
under the NHPA, the Forest Service focused on other goals. It set
forth the following statement of purpose:
(1) to ensure a consistent and reliable operating season, thereby
maintaining the economic viability of the Snowbowl and
stabilizing employment levels and winter tourism within the local
community; and (2) to improve safety, skiing conditions, and
recreational opportunities, bringing terrain and infrastructure
into balance with current use levels.
In short, the Forest Service seems to have framed its NEPA review
process by asking: "How can we approve these upgrades to the ski
resort?" This statement contains some implied recognition of
other groups such as the local community, skiers, and
recreationalists-and ultimately the decision to expand skiing and
snowmaking seems to have reflected their needs. There is no
mention of the various Indian peoples or their interests in the
environmental wellbeing of San Francisco Peaks.
The statement of purpose seems to set the tone for the entire
decision making process. After articulating its statement of
314. PATRICIA L. PARKER & THOMAS F. KING, U.S. DEPT. OF THE INTERIOR,
GUIDELINES FOR EVALUATING AND DOCUMENTING TRADITIONAL CULTURAL PROPERTIES
(rev. ed. 1998), available at http://www.cr.nps.gov/nr/publications/bulletins/nrb38/.
315. Navajo Nation v. U.S. Forest Serv., 408 F. Supp. 2d 866, 873 (D. Ariz. 2006).
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purpose, the Forest Service worked primarily with the Snowbowl to
develop the various proposals for snowmaking and ski expansion.
By the time it solicited input from the tribes and environmental
organizations, the Forest Service was already putting forth the
Snowbowl's proposal as its own and tribal input seemed somewhat
superfluous, at least from the tribes' perspective. Yet the tribal
peoples had concerns of the highest order. The Navajo plaintiffs
testified to the project's ramifications for the 225,000 members of
the Navajo tribe, for whom "the Peaks [are] the holiest shrine in
the Navajo way of life."3" 6 The Hopi plaintiffs claimed "the Peaks
are of central importance to the Hopi tradition, culture, and
religion [and] there is a direct relationship between the Hopi way
of life and the environment, including the Peaks."1 '
Despite the Indian concerns, the reviewing courts found the
narrow statement of purpose to be within the Forest Service's
discretion. It was appropriate to focus on the ski area because the
Forest Service had earlier classified the entire Snowbowl permit
area as a "Developed Recreation Site." ''1 Moreover, the decision
was consistent with the "multiple use mandate" and its direction to
provide public recreation opportunities.319 Thus the Forest Service
was clearly entitled, as a matter of administrative and public lands
law, to articulate its purpose narrowly. But ultimately it was not
well-served by this decision. By failing to take into account the
needs of Indian peoples, the Forest Service's decision led to
protracted litigation and was ultimately overturned as violating
RFRA.
A better approach would be to articulate a statement of
purpose explicitly referencing peoples affected by the relevant
land management issue. The agency would then gather tribal
officials and religious leaders from the outset, rather than
consulting with them as an afterthought. The Forest Service took
this approach in the facts leading up to the Wyoming Sawmills case.
There the Forest Service had described that its management
"purpose" was "to ensure that the Medicine Wheel and Medicine
Mountain are managed in a manner that protects the integrity of
the site as a sacred site and a nationally important traditional
316. Id. at 888.
317. Id. at 894.
318. Id. at 873.
319. Id. at 873.
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cultural property."'32 The Medicine Wheel statement could also be
more explicit about the people who value the site as a "traditional
cultural property" but at least their needs were referenced
implicitly and ultimately addressed very sensitively in a final
management plan.
b. Consultations.
Agencies should next tailor the NHPA consultation process to
the peoples identified in the statement of purpose. Indian
participants sometimes find the federal processes to be culturally
foreign, particularly when it comes to discussing the sensitive topic
of religion. 21 They may not be permitted by their religious beliefs
to submit written comments or voice public statements about their
ceremonial practices.322 Moreover, tribes may lack the financial or
administrative resources to participate in formal consultation
processes.
The failure to address these problems appears to have
hampered the consultation process in the Navajo Nation case. The
Forest Service had been consulting with tribes interested in San
Francisco Peaks since at least the 1970s when the original
expansion of the ski area occurred. Thus the Forest Service knew
which tribes to consult with and had some idea how to reach them.
Accordingly, over the course of two years, the Forest Service
mailed several rounds of letters and made numerous phone calls
inviting the tribes to participate and "specifically requesting tribal
input on the resolution of the adverse effects."323 For example, it
sent a letter to the Hopi Tribe informing them "that the owner of
the Snowbowl is working on a draft proposal, stat[ing] that the
Forest Service believes the Hopi should be involved in the
development of this proposal," and "ask[ing] for input on 'how
the interests and concerns of the Hopi people might best be
addressed' before the Forest Service accepts the proposal."324
One can well imagine that the Forest Service thought that
320. Wyo. Sawmills Inc. v. U.S. Forest Serv., 383 F.3d 1241,1245 (10th Cir. 2004).
321. See generally Sarah Palmer, Cherie Shanteau & Deborah Osborne, Strategies for
Addressing Native Traditional Cultural Properties, 20 NAT. RESOURCES & ENV'T 45 (2005).
322. See Carpenter, supra note 193, at 563.
323. Navajo Nation, 408 F. Supp. 2d at 880.
324. Navajo Nation v. U.S. Forest Serv., 479 F.3d 1024, 1060 (9th Cir. 2007).
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these attempts to communicate with the tribes were sufficient. Yet
several tribes reported never having received the letters. Tribal
religious practitioners described receiving in the mail heavy
binders containing hundreds of pages of data which they could not
meaningfully digest.32 5 This problem of cultural disconnect occurs
in many sacred sites consultations. It needs to be addressed if the
consultation process is to have any meaning at all. It is not enough
just to identify the affected Indian peoples and then subject them
to a boilerplate process of federal-style consultation. The
consultation process itself must be reflective of tribal peoplehood;
this means that the sacred sites consultation process must reflect
each tribe's cultural and political norms of receiving information,
digesting it, and making decisions.
The Bear Lodge case shows some progress in the consultation
process. The Park Service initiated meaningful conversations with
tribes and other stakeholders about the Proposed Climbing
Management Plan. In addition to the publication of drafts,
opportunity for notice and comment, and letter-writing campaign,
Park Service officials visited tribal communities to hold meetings
there. They asked for substantive input, and also learned about
how to develop communication channels with various Plains tribes,
intertribal organizations, and individual religious practitioners. 26
Paying attention to peoplehood concerns in the consultation
process may require intensive relationship-building between
agency officials and tribal peoples. One risk is that non-Indians
complain the administrative process unfairly fosters Indian
participation to the detriment of non-Indian participation. "27 The
agencies must take care to provide consultations processes that
also reflect the needs of non-Indian peoples. The solution is not a
one-size fits all approach, but one that makes the process
responsive to all affected peoples. The task will be expensive and
time-consuming, but ultimately worth the costs if the result is more
harmonious management of public lands.
325. See THE SNOWBOWL EFFECT: WHEN RECREATION AND CULTURE COLLIDE
(Indigenous Action Media 2005) (giving the testimony of tribal leaders and religious
practitioners).
326. See BURTON, supra note 47, at 131-35; see IN THE LIGHT OF REVERENCE (Bullfrog
Films 2001) (interview with Devil's Tower Superintendent Deb Liggett).
327. See Pendley, supra note 198, at 1024-25, 1028.
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c. Management documents.
A final procedural suggestion is for agencies to make all
affected peoples parties to the Memorandum of Understanding
(MOU) mandated by the NHPA and any other management
documents, such as an interim or final management plan.
Regulations promulgated under the NHPA require an agency to
develop an MOU for any sacred site that will be adversely affected
by a federal undertaking.2 The agency must secure various federal
and state historic preservation offices as parties to the MOU but
not the tribes. This omission is unfortunate. Like some of the
other limitations of the NHPA, the MOU is a procedural
mechanism that allows the agency to make only half-hearted
attempts to include the tribes and their concerns.
The Navajo Nation case is again instructive. After consultations
with the tribes, the Forest Service entered into a MOU that
included a number of attempts to mitigate adverse effects of the
project. These included:
(1) [tribal] access before, during and after construction; (2)
protection and regeneration of plants of traditional importance;
(3) that the Forest Service must work to ensure that current
ceremonial activities continue uninterrupted; (4) that the Forest
Service must protect shrines; (5) that the tribes must be provided
water-quality information; and (6) where practicable, projects
must take advantage of previously-disturbed areas.2 9
Further, the Forest Service promised that traditional religious
practitioners could use the ski lifts for free.3
None of these measures included in the MOU, no matter how
laudable, could mitigate the Navajo's and Hopis' fundamental
concerns. The Forest Service and Snowbowl were proposing to
cover the sacred San Francisco Peaks with sewage effluent on a
regular basis. This activity would desecrate their sacred mountain,
make their ceremonies impossible, and disrupt entire lifeways and
value systems. The Navajo and Hopi tribes did not sign on as
parties to the MOU, though the Havasupai and Hualapai tribes
did. The MOU was a precursor document to the Forest Service's
328. 36 C.F.R. § 800.6(c) (Westlaw 2008).
329. Navajo Nation v. U.S. Forest Serv., 408 F. Supp. 2d 866, 880 (D. Ariz. 2006).
330. Id.
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ultimate management decision. In February 2005, at the
culmination of the consultation and review process, the Forest
Supervisor issued a Final Environmental Impact Statement and
Record of Decision.33 ' The decision approved the Snowbowl's ski
area expansion project, including approval of 205 acres of
snowmaking coverage, using reclaimed water.32  The
accommodations for Indian religious practice were the same ones
provided for in the MOU, so the Navajo and Hopi tribes sued.
Again Wyoming Sawmills suggests a better alternative. When the
Forest Service first issued a Draft Environmental Impact Statement
for management of the sacred site-calling for unlimited vehicle
access except for certain times when the Medicine Wheel was
being used for ceremonial purposes-it received significant
criticism for failure to address Indian concerns."33 The criticism
seems to have prompted the Forest Service to work more
meaningfully with affected Indians. It initiated extensive
consultation with affected Indians and used the information
gleaned as the basis for a Memorandum of Agreement (MOA)
providing for closure of the road to Medicine Wheel except for
traditional religious practitioners' access.3 4 Notably, the Indians
were parties to the MOA. They were also parties to each
subsequent management plan for Medicine Wheel. This included
an interim agreement preventing "undertakings" including "any
new mining or timber harvesting" projects within 2.5 miles of
Medicine Wheel and a Final Management Plan calling for
consultation regarding any activity within 18,000 acres of the
Medicine Wheel. 5
2. Substance.
I suggest two reforms to substantive decision-making regarding
the management of sacred sites on the public lands. Agencies
should (1) recognize that Indians as peoples have a baseline of
enforceable religious exercise rights and (2) prioritize Indians'
non-fungible needs at sacred sites. As I argue below, these reforms
331. See id. at 870-71.
332. Id.
333. See Wyo. Sawmills Inc. v. U.S. Forest Serv., 383 F.3d 1241, 1244 (10th Cir. 2004).
334. Id.
335. Id. at 1244-45.
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will help agencies comply with RFRA's broad protections for
religious exercise and serve to effectuate existing federal policy in
favor of sacred sites accommodation.
a. Recognizing peoplehood interests in religious exercise.
Agencies have long operated under the assumption, based on
Lyng's interpretation of the First Amendment, that they need only
refrain from activities that will coerce religious belief by
individuals. But I believe that since the passage of RFRA, agencies
must refrain from burdening the religious exercise of tribal peoples
at sacred sites on the public lands. Focusing again on the Navajo
Nation case, I contrast the approach of the Forest Service and
federal district court (discounting peoplehood concerns) with the
approach of the Ninth Circuit (recognizing peoplehood
concerns). I suggest that the latter approach is not only consistent
with RFRA but also forms the basis of good land management
policy.
In the events leading up to Navajo Nation, the Forest Service's
Final Environmental Impact Statement had admitted that the ski
area expansion and snowmaking, "especially the use of reclaimed
water[,] would contaminate the natural resources needed to
perform the required ceremonies" that constitute "the cultural
identity of many of these tribes."3"6 The Forest Service had also
been aware that such impact would be "irretrievable" in terms of its
harm on the mountain, its soil, plants, and animals.337 However,
the Forest Service thought it was within its authority to disregard
this information gleaned through the NEPA and NHPA
consultation processes. Under the Lyng standard, the Forest
Service would have been quite right. The federal government was
thought to be largely immunized from charges that management
of its own lands could burden religious practice.
The District Court affirmed the Forest Service, in large part, by
focusing on the testimony that, in its view, failed to show
government coercion of individual religious belief under Lyng.
Both in the consultation process and at trial, witnesses presented
volumes of testimony about spiritual significance of the mountain
and the many ceremonial activities either taking place or related to
336. Navajo Nation v. U.S. Forest Serv., 479 F.3d 1024, 1039 (9th Cir. 2007).
337. Id.
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the mountain. But the court found all of this testimony
inadequate. Though Navajo witnesses testified to the Peaks'
centrality to the Navajo way of life, these particular witnesses had
not actually visited the Peaks themselves.3" A Navajo medicine man
conceded that he had not been "denied access to any part of the
Peaks. 3 Some plaintiffs, according to the count, did not personally
leave offerings on the mountain, did not collect water there, or did
not gather plants and medicines there. A Hopi witness explained
that his religion prevented him from disclosing specific shrines or
describing religious practices. 4°
The District Court sounded like Lyng all over again when it
held that the Forest Service's action "does not coerce individuals
into acting contrary to their religious beliefs nor does it penalize
anyone for practicing his or her religion."34' This standard
confined RFRA to the narrow First Amendment standard approach
articulated in Lyng. It also shifted the evidentiary analysis in the
government's favor. Focusing on the religious beliefs of
individuals, the court could harp on all of the evidentiary
weaknesses of individual witnesses-and ignore the overwhelming
effects of the snowmaking plan on Indian tribes and their ways of
life.
The Ninth Circuit took a different look at the same evidence
when it reviewed the RFRA claim. It first identified which tribal
activities constituted "religious exercise" and then assessed
whether the Forest Service's action would "substantially burden"
these activities.342 In assessing the evidence on these factors, the
court focused on religious beliefs and practices of the tribes as
tribes, rather than limiting its inquiry to individual religious
practices.
For example, the court discussed the historic journey of Hopi
clans to the Peaks to enter into a "spiritual covenant ... to take
care of the land"; the Peaks as the home of the Hopi ancestors or
Katsinam; and the role of the Katsinam in Hopi ceremonial and
338. See Navajo Nation v. U.S. Forest Serv., 408 F. Supp. 2d 866, 889 (D. Ariz. 2006).
339. Id.
340. Id. at 890-91.
341. Id. The district court also found that the government had met the "compelling
interest" and "least restrictive means" tests. Id. at 906-07.
342. Navajo Nation v. U.S. Forest Serv., 479 F.3d 1024, 1033-34 (9th Cir. 2007).
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agricultural life. 43 When the court described Hopi pilgrimages to
the Peaks, it was not to highlight the religious exercise of any
particular pilgrim. Rather the description emphasized that
religious leaders are selected from forty congregations (or kivas) to
visit shrines, gather water and fir boughs for Katsinam ceremonies,
in which the entire community participated. The same approach
prevaile, in the assessment of the Navajos' "exercise of religion."
The court observed that "the whole of the Peaks is the holiest of
shrines in the Navajo way of life."3" This was not so because any
particular religious or political leader visited the Peaks, but
because the Peaks had a role in fundamental religious experiences
such as the Navajo creation story, Navajo medicine bundles, Navajo
healing ceremonies, the Navajo sense of place and "every Navajo
religious ceremony." '345
The court observed religious "burdens" in two general
categories, namely, the (1) inability to conduct certain ceremonies
"because the ceremony requires collecting natural resources that
would be too contaminated-physically, spiritually, or both-for
sacramental use" and (2) inability to maintain "daily and annual
religious practices comprising an entire way of life" because such
practices "require belief in the mountain's purity or a spiritual
connection to the mountain that would be undermined by the
contamination."
346
As to the first category of harm, Navajo religious practitioner
Larry Foster testified that using sewage effluent on the Peaks
"would be like injecting me and my mother, my grandmother, the
Peaks, with impurities, foreign matter that's not natural." '47 This
sentiment reflected, in part, a Navajo understanding that water,
once tainted, cannot be "reclaimed" or made pure again. Because
he would not be able to go on religious pilgrimages if the Peaks
were so desecrated, 34 ' he would also not be able to rejuvenate
343. Id. at 1034-35.
344. Id. at 1035.
345. Id. at 1035-36.
346. Id. at 1039.
347. Id. at 1040.
348. Id. (Navajo practitioner Larry Foster testified: "[I]f someone were to get a prick
or whatever from a contaminated needle, it doesn't matter what the percentage is, your
whole body would become contaminated. And that's what would happen to the
mountain." Medicine man Norris Nez said: "All of it is holy and sacred. It is like our body.
Every part of it is holy and sacred.").
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medicine bundles which are necessary for Navajo healing
ceremonies. Medicine Man Norris Nez testified: "Like the western
doctor has his black bag with needles and other medicine, this
bundle has in there the things to apply medicine to a patient.
34
9
Because these medicines were gathered from San Francisco Peaks,
the contamination of the mountain would eventually affect "all
[Navajo medicine] bundles," ultimately making it impossible to
perform the Blessingway ceremony.50
Religious practitioner Foster also connected the burdens of the
proposed snowmaking quite expressly to their impact on the
Navajo people:
Your Honor, our way of life, our culture we live in-we live in the
blessingway, in harmony. We try to walk in harmony, be in
harmony with all of nature. And we go to all of the sacred
mountains for protection. We go on a pilgrimage similar to
Muslims going to Mecca. And we do this with so much love,
commitment and respect. And if one mountain-and more in
particularly with the San Francisco Peaks-which is our bundle
mountain, or sacred, bundle mountain, were to be poisoned or
given foreign materials that were not pure, it would create an
imbalance-there would not be a place among the sacred
mountains. We would not be able to go there to obtain herbs or
medicines to do our ceremonies, because that mountain would
then become impure. It would not be pure anymore. And it
would be a devastation for our people.351
With respect to the second type of burden, entire religious
"way of life," the court was particularly persuaded by the Hopis'
testimony. Hopi religious practitioner Leigh Kuwanwisiwma
testified that when the Hopi clan entered into the spiritual
covenant with the deities and Katsinam that reside in the Peaks, the
mountains "were in their purest form." '352
The purity of the spirits, as best we can acknowledge the spiritual
domain, ... were content in receiving the Hopi clans. So when
you begin to intrude on that in a manner that is really
disrespectful to the Peaks and to the spiritual home of the
349. Id. at 1035.
350. Id.
351. Id. at 1040.
352. Id. at 1041.
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Katsina, it affects the Hopi people. It affects the Hopi people,
because as clans left and embarked on their migrations and later
coming to the Hopi villages, we experienced still a mountain and
peaks that were in their purest form as a place of worship to go
to, to visit, to place our offerings, the tranquility, the sanctity that
we left a long time ago was still there.53
Though such experiences were historical, they have contemporary
repercussions. If the Hopis allowed the mountain to be desecrated
today, they would be violating their spiritual covenant to take care
of it. The Katsinam dance ceremonies would become "simply. .. a
performance" rather than "a religious effort." '54  The
contamination caused by sewage effluent would "undermine the
Hopi faith in their daily ceremonies and undermine the Hopi faith
in their Kachina ceremonies as well as their faith in the blessings of
life that they depend on the Kachina to bring."
355
Based on this evidence Ninth Ciicuit held that the Navajo and
Hopi tribes had presented evidence of a burden on religion.316 The
court next turned to RFRA's requirement that the plaintiff show
that the burden on religious exercise is "substantial" versus a mere
"inconvenience." 357 The governmental activity must "prevent the
plaintiff from engaging in religious conduct or having a religious
experience., 35' Here again the court was willing to look at the
plaintiffs as tribal peoples and assess whether they experienced a
substantial burden on a collective level. The Navajo witnesses had
demonstrated that use of sewage effluent would prevent the
''rejuvenation" of medicine bundles which were needed for
Blessingway and healing ceremonies.15' The Hopi witnesses had
demonstrated that "contamination by the effluent would
fundamentally undermine their entire system of belief and the
associated practices of song, worship, and prayer that depend on
the Peaks, which is the source of rain and their livelihoods and the
home of the Katsinam spirits. ''3' This testimony, in the Ninth
353. Id.
354. Id.
355. Id. at 1042.
356. Id. at 1039-42.
357. Id. at 1042.
358. Id. (internal quotations and citations omitted).
359. Id. at 1043.
360. Id.
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Circuit's view, demonstrated a substantial burden on their
religion. 6'
b. Prioritizing non-fungible peoplehood needs in sacred sites.
Thus agencies should be aware that Indians, as peoples, may be
able show a substantial burden to religious exercise under RFRA. If
they meet this standard, the government must then show that its
activity is the least restrictive means of furthering a compelling
interest. Because Lyng had effectively immunized agencies from
judicial review on the merits of this test, the Navajo Nation case
again serves as an important model under current law.
Reduced to its most basic terms, Navajo Nation pitted the
Arizona Snowbowl's corporate profits against the Indian tribes'
religious freedoms. The various partners in the Arizona Snowbowl
Resort were distant investors-and the Arizona Peaks were, for
them, just another asset.362 By contrast, the Peaks were a spiritual
living being, a sacred place of the highest spiritual and cultural
value for the tribes. The snowmaking proposal would have
devastatingly personal impacts on religious practitioners and the
tribes as a whole. It did not seem right to the tribes that modest
economic gain, or even recreation interests, should justify such
desecration to a sacred site and entire ways of life.
To put it in Radin's framework, the tribes decried the idea that
fungible corporate uses of the Peaks would trump their non-
fungible peoplehood interests. Moreover, no legal decisionmaker
was even required to confront explicitly the fact that the
snowmaking plan would protect corporate profit at the expense of
tribal religious freedom. Ignoring these issues would make sense
under Lyng, where it seemed that no case could be made for the
religious use. But Navajo Nation shows that where government
action substantially burdens religious exercise, RFRA requires
decision-makers assess the relative merits of competing uses under
the compelling interest test. Fungibility should be an element of
this assessment.
As Ninth Circuit observed, the compelling interest test is "the
most demanding" constitutional standard and allows "only those
361. Id.
362. See THE SNOwBoWL EFFECT, supra note 325 (featuring documentary interviews
with tribal leaders and religious practitioners).
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interests of the "highest order and those not otherwise served [to]
overbalance legitimate claims to the free exercise of religion.9
363
The government's compelling interest argument centered on the
idea that without the new snowmaking, the economic success of
the Snowbowl was at risk.3 ' But the Ninth Circuit did not find this
argument compelling at all. The Snowbowl had always operated in
relatively dry conditions-as a result of its location in the desert-
and still managed to continue skiing operations. The Snowbowl's
new owners had been aware of these limitations when they
purchased the ski area, but hoped that with the new snowmaking
and expansion "the resort would be substantially more profitable
and the income stream more consistent.
'365
The Forest Service also cited its obligation to provide
recreational opportunities on the public lands as a compelling
interest. But the court pointed out that even if the ski resort
changed hands or the Snowbowl stopped offering downhill skiing,
the public could still enjoy a whole range of recreational activities
including motorcross, mountain biking, horseback riding, hiking,
camping, cross-country skiing, snowshoeing, and snowplay.366
The court did not believe that the economic and religious uses
were mutually exclusive in this case. The Snowbowl would likely
continue operating even without the snowmaking. The court wrote
in dicta, however, that even if the "very survival" of the Snowbowl
as a ski resort were on the line, this could not trump the survival of
Indian religious lifeways under RFRA.367 Thus the government's
interest in promoting economically profitable uses of the public
lands would have to yield to the religious interests of the tribes.
Framing Navajo Nation in terms of a theory of property and
peoplehood, I would argue that the Ninth Circuit created a
hierarchy of fungible concerns, and then appropriately privileged
the tribes' non-fungible peoplehood interests over the fungible
economic claims of the Forest Service and Snowbowl.3 6 It required
other fungible property rights to yield to conflicting tribal interests
363. Navajo Nation v. U.S. Forest Serv., 479 F.3d 1024, 1043 (9th Cir. 2007).
364. Id. at 1044.
365. Id.
366. Id. at 1045.
367. Id. at 1044.
368. See Radin, The Liberal Conception, supra note 23, at 1686-87.
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in religion.369 This approach contrasts significantly with previous
decisions. In Lyng, the Supreme Court allowed the government's
fungible interests in timber and road development to destroy the
Indians' non-fungible relationship with a sacred site.37° In Bear
Lodge, the court accorded some protection for non-fungible Indian
religious practices, but ultimately required them to yield to the
relatively fungible commercial and recreational rock climbing
interests.
As the Navajo Nation case also suggests, the accommodation of
multiple uses can still occur under a property and peoplehood
approach, so long as non-fungible needs are prioritized. In Navajo
Nation, skiing and snowmaking are allowed, but only to the extent
that they refrain from burdening Indian religion. In some
instances, however, competing uses will be truly incompatible-as
in cases where a development activity would desecrate a sacred site.
Then, the fungible use should yield altogether to the non-fungible
one. The very fact that some land uses are fungible suggests that
this is the appropriate ordering of claims. The claimant with the
fungible use can be compensated or otherwise made whole
through a land exchange of equal value. An earlier dispute on the
San Francisco Peaks represented just such a case. In the 1990s, the
White Vulcan Pumice mine was operating on ninety acres of the
Peaks. 7' When it became apparent that the mine was violating
numerous environmental standards, as well as tribal religious
needs, the government negotiated with the owner to close the
mine, restore the site, and relinquish its mining claims, in
exchange for a one million dollar settlement figure to be paid by
the federal government to the company.372 While the White Vulcan
369. Radin, supra note 22, at 1015.
370. Cf Michael W. McConnell & Richard A. Posner, An Economic Approach to Issues of
Religious Freedom, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 33-54 (1989). In this article, McConnell and Posner
revisit Lyng by weighing the benefits to the lumber companies (who have an interest in
logging) and other citizens (who can use the logging road for other purposes) against the
harm to the Indians (destruction of their religion). They conclude that "the injury to the
Indians religious interest appears unusually severe . . . while the secular interests seem
relatively slight." Id. at 48.
371. Shannon Kelly, San Francisco Peaks, in CANYONS, CULTURES, AND
ENVIRONMENTAL CHANGE: AN INTRODUCTION TO THE LAND-USE HISTORY OF THE
COLORADO PLATEAU (John D. Grahme & Tomas D. Sisk eds., 2002), available at
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case is an interesting model, a literal "buy-out" of claimants with
fungible interests may only be necessary if they have vested
property interests under the Fifth Amendment or to promote
settlement.73 In other cases when Indians have raised sacred sites
objections, resource developers have agreed to relocate their
projects?"
The Navajo Nation case finally shows how some land claims will
be "relatively" fungible. Recreation, tourism, and local community
interests probably fall in this category. The City of Flagstaff cited its
interests in promoting environmentally feasible water use through
its sewage effluent program and increasing tax revenues and
employment opportunities for citizens.37 5 The Forest Service
claimed that it was protecting the safety of public land users and
providing recreational opportunities. For citizens, skiing at the
Arizona Snowbowl may be a special experience: located within ten
miles of Flagstaff, it may provide an opportunity for people to ski
close to home or for families to enjoy the outdoors together.
It would be hard to translate these experiences into monetary
values. Thus, they are not completely fungible. At the same time,
they are more fungible than Indian interests in sacred sites. If the
Snowbowl were to close, Flagstaff's skiers could drive twenty miles
further to the Williams Ski Area. The Forest Service could enhance
373. See Carpenter, supra note 46, at 1099 n.241 (discussing cases that evaluate
whether private parties have Fifth Amendment takings claims for property interests on the
public lands).
374. In several cases, companies have decided on their own to forego extractive
activities after learning of their sacred quality to tribes. See, e.g., Hillary Rosner, Saving a
Sacred Lake: Zuni Activist Pablo Padilla, HIGH COUNTRY NEWS, Feb. 2, 2004, available at
http://ivww.hcn.org/servlets/hcn.Article?article-id=14527 (reporting decision of mining
company to abandon project near sacred Zuni Salt Lake); Press Release, Interior Dep't,
Nat'l Trust for Historic Preservation, & Anschutz Exploration Corp., Agreement to Protect
Historical and Cultural Features of Weatherman Draw, available at
http://www.sacredland.org/PDFs/
WeathermanDrawPress.pdf (reporting decision of Anschutz Corporation to refrain from
drilling at Weatherman Draw, Montana, a tribal sacred site and transfer oil and gas leases
to the National Trust for Historic Preservation). In some of these cases, the companies
may have decided that the costs of battling tribal opposition outweigh the costs of
relocating the natural resource development project.
375. See U.S. Forest Serv., Coconino Nat'l Forest, Frequently Asked Questions,
http://www.fs.fed.us/r3/coconino/publications/snowbowl/faq.shtml (last visited Mar. 2,
2008) ("Flagstaff has a diverse economic base that is not completely dependent upon the
AZ Snowbowl; however this proposal will have a positive net effect on Flagstaff s winter
economy. These economic benefits will be reflected in increased revenues from property,
sales, and BBB taxes, and in higher local employment.").
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recreation opportunities on its dozens of other properties in the
state. The City of Flagstaff may have other opportunities for
increasing employment or environmentally-sensitive water use. But
Navajo religious practitioners have no way of replacing their
religious practices if the San Francisco Peaks are desecrated with
sewage effluent.1
6
The relativity of claims applies on the Indian side of sacred site
disputes too. As the Ninth Circuit recognized, most of the Navajo
and Hopi practices could only occur on the San Francisco Peaks.
77
The Navajo Changing Woman story took place on the Peaks and
medicine men must recharge their healing bundles on that
mountain. The Hopi received their spiritual covenant to take care
of the land at the Peaks and the Hopi Katsinam cannot decamp to
a different mountain today. Navajo and Hopi shrines are located
on the mountain. Thus it was clear to the court that various Navajo
and Hopi practices would be substantially burdened (indeed
obliterated) by the snowmaking proposal.178 The Havasupai and
Hualapai uses of the Peaks presented a closer question of
substantial burden, which the court declined to reach.3 79 The Peaks
figured in Havasupai and Hualapai origin stories and informed
these tribes' use of waters and pine needles in ceremonial
practices. Some practitioners testified that they used water that
they believed to have come from the Peaks in sweat lodges; yet it
was not entirely clear that the water and pine needles had to come
from San Francisco Peaks for religious efficacy."'
Of course, the parties did not brief these facts in terms of the
question of non-fungibility. If asked to address this question, the
Havasupai and Hualapai might cite a religious reason why water
and plants must be gathered on the Peaks for spiritual efficacy. Yet
it is also possible that some tribal religious land uses are
completely non-fungible, while others are relatively fungible.
These are difficult questions that intrude into the sphere of
religion to an extent that makes lawyers uncomfortable. In Lyng,
376. Cf Lyng v. Nw. Indian Cemetery Protective Ass'n, 485 U.S. 439, 468 (1988).
(Brennan, J., dissenting) (pointing out that Indian parties "do not even have the option,
however unattractive it might be, of migrating to more hospitable locales; the site-specific
nature of their belief system renders it nontransportable").
377. Navajo Nation v. U.S. Forest Serv., 479 F.3d 1024, 1042-43 (9th Cir. 2007).
378. Id. at 1042.
379. Id. at 1043.
380. Id. at 1042.
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Justice O'Connor rejected a line of jurisprudence evaluating the
relative "centrality" of religious practices, on grounds that the
courts should not be engaged in theological judgments."'
Unfortunately, however, O'Connor's solution was to announce a
bright-line rule that puts all Indian religions at risk of complete
destruction.
Instead of unilaterally denying all legal protection to Indian
religious practices on the public lands, decision makers should
work with tribes to understand what kinds of practices are really at
stake. Agency officials are better suited to this task than federal
judges. We expect federal agencies to acquire and apply expertise
on the most complicated questions of science, finance,
intelligence, and security; it is reasonable to expect them to
acquire expertise about American Indian religions.382 When it
comes to prioritizing among claims, agencies should use their
expertise and the tribal consultation process to determine which
claims are non-fungible. If an agency must then make difficult
decisions among uses, it should create a "hierarchy" of fungibility
and make its decisions accordingly.383 The agency should offer the
greatest protection for the uses most tied up with peoplehood and
least realizable elsewhere.
B. Legislative Reforms
As the above discussion suggests, federal law and policy
empowers land managers to protect Indian interests in sacred
sites-if these land managers want to do so. If, however, officials
continue to disregard Indian peoplehood interests at sacred sites,
it will be appropriate to think about legislative reform. These
reforms should build on existing law. The NHPA already sets forth
381. See Lyng, 485 U.S. at 457-58 (rejecting the "centrality" test on grounds that it
would improperly entangle courts in theological debates, thereby "cast[ing] the Judiciary
in a role that we were never intended to play").
382. See generally EDLEY, supra note 313 (citing expertise and accountability as
justifications for agency discretion); David A. King, Procedural Fairness, Personal Benefits,
Agency Expertise, and Planning Participants' Support for the Forest Service, 39 NAT. RESOURCESJ.
443 (1999). Admittedly, the Forest Service and Park Service are expected to be expert in
land use management, not American Indian religions, but given the number of sacred
sites on federal public lands, it is reasonable to expect them to be expert at least in the
religious practices that occur at the sacred sites within their jurisdiction.
383. See Radin, The Liberal Conception, supra note 23, at 1686-87.
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a baseline for administrative procedure on sacred sites
management and AIRFA articulates a federal policy of recognizing
Indian religious freedoms at sacred sites. Both statutes could use
some "teeth" however. 84 Thus, Congress could amend NHPA to
make mandatory the procedural reforms suggested above
(recognizing Indians as peoples in various stages of the land
management decision process). Federal agencies could do the
same by amending their regulations to include these procedural
changes. Additionally, Congress could consider amending the
statutes creating specific national forests and parks to reference
sacred sites located therein and explicate the agency's duty to
prioritize Indian relationships with sacred sites over competing
uses of those forests and parks."8 5
With respect to improving substantive protections for sacred
sites, Congress could amend the American Indian Religious
Freedom Act to incorporate the RFRA standard. Such an
amendment would essentially codify Navajo Nation, making it clear
that RFRA applies to sacred sites on federal public lands and is
enforceable by both tribes and individuals in federal court. A
model of enforceable, substantive protection for Indian cultural
property is the Native American Graves Protection and
Repatriation Act of 1990 (NAGPRA)."86 NAGPRA provides for the
repatriation of Indian human remains and cultural items found on
federal or tribal lands (or within museums receiving full or partial
federal funds) and imposes civil and criminal penalties for
trafficking in such items."' While some of its provisions are
procedural in nature, and include limited tribal rights of consult
on excavations,388 NAGPRA also contains substantive requirements
of repatriation and grants federal court jurisdiction over actions to
enforce the Act.389 NAGPRA's protections extend to tribes, and
384. See Lyng, 485 U.S. at 455 (AIRFA "has no teeth in it").
385. Cf Bluemel, supra note 47, at 533 & n.350 (citing Proclamation No. 68, 43 Stat.
1977 (1924) (designating Wupatki National Monument specifically to protect Hopi
ruins)).
386. See 25 U.S.C. §§ 3002(a)-3005(a) (Westlaw 2008).
387. See 18 U.S.C. § 1170 (Westlaw 2008).
388. See generally Angela R. Riley, Indian Remains, Human Rights: Reconsidering
Entitlement Under the Native American Graves Protection and Repatriation Act, 24 COLUM. HUM.
RTS. L. REV. 49, 62-66 (2002) (describing tribal rights of consultation under NAGPRA).
389. See 25 U.S.C. § 3013 (Westlaw 2008). For criticism of NAGPRA, see, for
example, S. Alan Ray, Native American Identity and the Challenge of Kennewick Man, 79 TEMP.
L. REV. 89 (2006); Allison M. Dussias, Kennewick Man, Kinship and the "Dying Race": The
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serve to effectuate Indians' property and peoplehood interests in
cultural patrimony, human remains, and burial grounds.
The ultimate effectuation of Indian property and peoplehood
claims at sacred sites would be the repatriation of these lands to
tribes. Congress has only restored tribal ownership to sacred sites
in rare instances, with Taos Pueblo's recovery of Blue Lake serving
as a model.39
C. Considering Critiques
1. Sovereignty versus peoplehood?
Critics might argue that the language of peoplehood is neither
necessary nor desirable39" ' because Indians' collective status is
defined by federal law.39 Indeed, tribes are "sovereigns" who enjoy
an exclusive political relationship with the United States.393
Ninth Circuit's Assimilationist Assault on the Native American Graves Protection and Repatriation
Act, 84 NEB. L. REV. 55 (2005).
390. See, e.g., Wallace Coffey & Rebecca Tsosie, Rethinking the Tribal Sovereignty
Doctrine: Cultural Sovereignty and the Collective Future of Indian Nations, 12 STAN L. & POL'Y
REV. 191, 205 (2001) (describing the legislative restoration of Blue Lake to Taos Pueblo
and Kaho 'olawe to the Native Hawaiian people).
391. Similar, though not identical, themes were debated in a scholarly exchange
between David C. Williams, The Borders of the Equal Protection Clause: Indians as Peoples, 38
UCLA L. REv. 759 (1991) (arguing for treatment of Indians as "peoples," under the
Fourteenth Amendment and international human rights law, as a solution to perceived
problem. Congressional Indian legislation is race-based and should be subjected to strict
scrutiny) and Carole E. Goldberg-Ambrose, Not "Strictly" Racial: A Response To "Indians As
Peoples", 39 UCLA L. REV. 169 (1991) (criticizing Williams' article as failing to appreciate
the danger of characterizing Indian legislation as race-based, the unlikelihood of the
Supreme Court recognizing tribes as peoples, and suggesting that a better solution is to
rely on Congressional commerce clause power to legislate in Indian affairs). While my
project is somewhat different than Professor Williams', some of Professor Goldberg's
concerns might be raised in response to my peoplehood argument and I have tried to
address them here. I broadly define "peoples" with reference to self-definition, tribal,
domestic, and international law, and support their inclusion in legal processes, but
acknowledge that not all peoples are similarly situated. Thus, religious, ethnic, or political
peoples may have unique identities and entitlements, but these are not the same ones that
Indian tribes can claim. My definition of Indian tribes as "peoples" does not depart from
their status as political sovereigns under treaties, the Constitution, and other foundational
instruments or statutes of federal Indian law. Rather, it is meant to emphasize the
"personal" or human dimensions of sacred sites cases for Indian tribes as collective entities
and should also invite broader analysis of other group rights to property in U.S. law.
392. Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1, 17 (1831) (tribes are "domestic
dependent nations").
393. See Rebecca Tsosie, The Conflict Between the "Public Trust" and "Indian Trust"
Doctrines: Federal Public Land Policy and Native Nations, 39 TULSA L. REv. 271, 272, 301-10
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Deviating from tribes' unique status by appeal to the broadly
applicable model of peoplehood might demote tribes to mere
stakeholders clamoring alongside other peoples to have their
claims heard in the federal land management process.1 4 Though
the fact of tribal sovereignty and related legal arguments have not
yet worked to protect Indian interests at sacred sites, I agree that
the special status of Indian nations should play a prominent role in
decisions about sacred site management. The inclusion of other
"peoples," however can be justified both prudentially and
jurisprudentially.
From a prudential perspective, a more inclusive approach may
ultimately serve Indian interests at sacred sites. The present
situation is that tribal viewpoints on sacred sites inspire challenges
from all quarters. Perhaps anticipating such challenges, federal
public land managers now extend only the smallest
accommodations of sacred site usage to tribes in the hopes that
these accommodations survive legal challenges. Perhaps if non-
Indians were included as peoples in the land management process,
they might have their own concerns addressed, "buy in" to
management plans, and be less likely to contest them in court.
395
My recommendation would be to invite the participation of a
very broad group of peoples in the federal land management
process. As described in the definitional discussion above, some
scholars require a group to be a political entity in order to qualify
as a people, whereas others recognize peoples who organize along
cultural, religious, or ethnic lines. 9 In the sacred sites decision-
making process, I believe it makes sense to include all groups that
self-identify as peoples and have a legitimate claim to the property
in question. An inclusive approach would not only instill a feeling
of enfranchisement among groups but also appropriately raise a
broad spectrum of land management issues that officials should
address as a matter of comprehensive decision-making.
The broad inclusion of peoples should not, however, cause
federal decision-makers to lose sight of the fact that the various
(2003) (exploring how Indian claims to sacred sites can be based in the tribal sovereignty
framework).
394. See id. at 292, 300.
395. See BURTON, supra note 47, at 114 (describing the participation of Indian and
non-Indian "subcultural groups" in the consultation process at Devil's Tower).
396. See SMITH, supra note 48, at 19-21.
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peoples may be situated differently, with distinct entitlements to
places on the public lands. 9' What I mean is that from a
jurisprudential perspective, Indian nations do have a unique status
as political sovereigns maintaining a nation-to-nation relationship
with the United States. 98 This status justifies special treatment of
Indian nations, insulating federal Indian legislation from the strict
scrutiny review that might otherwise undermine various important
Indian programs."' This special status also confers distinctive
rights in the sacred sites arena. As Professor Burton has argued,
the very first thing an agency should do in a sacred site dispute is
to recognize tribes' political status by explicating the special treaty
rights, statutory or regulatory law, trust duties, historical
relationship, and circumstances under which the tribes originally
lost access to their sacred site. These elements will often give tribes
a stronger set of legal and moral claims to accommodation than
other groups can claim.
While political, cultural, religious, or ethnic peoples do not
have the same status of American Indians, they may have their own
histories and characteristics that merit special attention when it
comes to public lands management. A new initiative of the
National Park Service, for example, recognizes African American
interests in national parks with an historical association to slavery,
the civil rights movement, or other group experiences,4 0 and the
Bureau of Land Management negotiated a special lease with the
Church of Latter Day Saints to give the church significant
management control over a site where Mormon ancestors died
while fleeing religious persecution in the east.4"'
Thus, African Americans and Mormons have been treated by
federal land managers as collectives deserving special
acknowledgement on account of group history and experiences.
397. See id. at 20 (some peoples will "advance 'strong' claims to allegiance over a
'wide' range of issues down to those more politically trivial groups that advance only 'weak'
claims to allegiance over a 'narrow' range of issues").
398. See Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535, 552 (1974).
399. See id.
400. See Nat'l Park Serv., Celebrating African American History and Culture,
http://www.nps.gov/history/aahistory/bhm-intro.htm (last visited Mar. 2, 2008) (listing
parks, historic sites, and memorials with special significance to African Americans and
describing a new movement of interpretation and scholarship associated with these sites).
401. See generally Kevin Holdsworth, Why Martin's Cove Matters, 83 DENV. U. L. REv.
1003 (2006).
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By affording broad recognition to peoplehood issues, while still
respecting the unique status of Indian nations, agencies can aspire
to manage the public lands as true "intercultural commons.
402
2. Peoplehood as a divisive approach?
Some readers might argue that recognizing the interests of sub-
national peoples will make sacred sites law and policy
problematically divisive. Admittedly, in the years following
conquest, Americans have themselves developed a strong
attachment to the public lands. As a collective people, Americans
express strong attachments to concepts of wilderness,403 national
pride,44 and conquest4 5 embodied in the national parks. Others
argue that the public lands should be used as national resources to
advance economic prosperity, defense, or a conservation agenda.4 6
Many citizens believe that their American citizenship confers an
unfettered right of individual (or corporate) access to the national
parks, forests, and monuments for recreation and other purposes.
Thus, the public lands already foster competing claims-and
recognizing the concerns of peoples may make public land
402. See BURTON, supra note 47, at 283.
403. See RODERICK FRAZIER NASH, WILDERNESS AND THE AMERICAN MIND 350-51 (4"'
ed. 2001); MAX OELSCHLAEGER, THE IDEA OF WILDERNESS 3 (1991).
404. See Nat'l Park Serv., Carving History-Mount Rushmore National Memorial,
http://www.nps.gov/moru/park history/carvinghist/carving__history.htm (Aug. 2, 2002)
("Carved into the southeast face of a mountain in South Dakota are the faces of four
presidents, a memorial to American history. The faces of George Washington, Thomas
Jefferson, Theodore Roosevelt and Abraham Lincoln look down from their stony heights
and remind everyone that even the impossible is possible."); cf HUSTON SMITH, IN
CONVERSATION WITH NATIVE AMERICANS ON RELIGIOUS FREEDOM: A SEAT AT THE TABLE 67
(2006) ("I love Mt. Rushmore, because every time I look at that monstrosity I know that I
will never back down on being Lakota. Every one of those gentlemen up there represents
institutionalized genocide against the American Indian people .... So long as that thing,
Mount Rushmore, sits in our sacred lands, I have a responsibility to live my culture."
(quoting Charlotte Black Elk)).
405. See MARK DAVID SPENCE, DISPOSSESSING THE WILDERNESS 55-70 (1999)
(discussing the use of military force and other tactics to remove Indians from Yellowstone
National Park, making room for white uses, values, and occupation); Derek De Bakker, The
Court of Last Resort: American Indians in the Inter-American Human Rights System, 11 CARDOZO
J. INT'L & COMP. L. 939, 970 & n.242 (2004) (describing the carving of Mount Rushmore
as a "final act of humiliation" against the Sioux to make clear that the United States has no
intention of returning the Black Hills).
406. Cf Robert B. Keiter, Public Lands and Law Reform: Putting Theory, Policy, and
Practice in Perspective, 2005 UTAH L. REV. 1127, 1128-29 (considering various evolutions in
policy regarding the purposes of public lands).
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management an increasingly divisive proposition.
These concerns resonate more generally in peoplehood
scholarship. At the descriptive level, ProfessorJohn Lie argues that
peoplehood grows out of now anachronistic and somewhat
irrelevant designations of race, ethnicity, and nation, all of which
fail to "offer[] a solid basis for modern peoplehood."4' 7 In reality,
an individual's identification with a (singular) people obscures
overlapping identities and the mobility of populations. A Christian
may be German or Arab. A Jewish person might be Israeli or
Ethiopian, white or black, Hebrew-speaking or not. A Navajo may
be an American, an Arizonan, a Mormon-or all three. As these
examples suggest, "modern peoplehood creates a fiction of
homogeneity, of holistic essences. . . . Particular individuality is
bypassed in the name of an abstract collectivity. '"40 The only
explanation for the persistence of peoples today is, in Lie's view,
the modern preoccupation with "identity transmission" over "status
distinction. 409
Lie further argues that peoplehood distinctions perpetuate
normatively undesirable developments. The ugly underside of
fostering identity along racial, ethnic, and religious lines is conflict
between groups.410 Incidents of genocide in the modern era reflect
these tensions between national and sub-national identities at their
most extreme.1 Peoplehood has been specifically problematic in
the property arena as well. Around the world, governments have
used the notion of peoplehood as a philosophical or political basis
for appropriating property occupied by other (arguably) less
powerful groups4"2 and individuals.413 In the United States, federal
407. LIE, supra note 48, at 15.
408. See id. at 272.
409. Id. at 15.
410. See id. at 224.
411. See id. at 191-231.
412. See, e.g., George E. Bisharat, Land, Law and Legitimacy in Israel and the Occupied
Territories, 43 AM. U. L. REV. 467, 474, 475-490 (1994) (discussing "the centrality of land
acquisition to the Zionist enterprise"); EDWARD SAID, THE QUESTION OF PALESTINE 97
(1992) (describing various methods by which the Zionist movement acquired lands for the
establishment of Israel). For a viewpoint more sympathetic to the Israeli cause, see
generally ALAN DERSHOWITZ, THE CASE FOR ISRAEL (2004).
413. Consider the Supreme Court's much-discussed decision in Kelo v. City of New
London, 545 U.S. 468, 484 (2005) (upholding, under the "public use" doctrine, city's
condemnation of residences for urban redevelopment project). The decision has been
criticized for its failure to respect the property rights of both individuals, see Wendell E.
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officials and citizens have historically tried to justify the
dispossession of Indian lands by reference to the needs of the
American people."4 Showing that no people is immune from
abusing its powers, however, Indian tribes have in recent years
used tribal sovereignty to banish individuals from the tribal land
base, with some of these cases resting on questionable rationales.11
Whatever the intellectual failings of "peoplehood," however,
even critics acknowledge that individuals do, in practice, long for
collective experiences and affiliate themselves as peoples, sub-
national and otherwise.416 This point of legal realism is well-taken
in the federal public lands context. Numerous national subgroups
have specialized interests in the public lands.417 Mormon religious
practitioners visit and preserve places associated with their
migration to Utah, including those now owned by the federal
government.4 ' Rural communities may have a shared desire or
need to maintain livelihoods based on grazing, mining, or drilling
the public lands.4 9 Hispanic descendants of Spanish land grantees
similarly claim that land access for subsistence purposes is
necessary for their cultural, social, and economic survival.42°
Pritchett, Beyond Kelo: Thinking About Urban Development in the 21st Century, 22 GA. ST. U. L.
Rev. 895, 908 (2006) ("[T]he public is concerned that the government may take the
homes of fellow citizens."); and minority groups, see Kelo, 545 U.S. at 522 (Thomas, J.,
dissenting) ("Urban renewal projects have long been associated with the displacement of
blacks .... Regrettably, the predictable consequence of the Court's decision will be to
exacerbate these effects.").
414. See Russell L. Barsh, Behind Land Claims: Rationalizing Dispossession in Anglo-
American Law, 1 LAW & ANTHROPOLOGY 15, 20-26, 28-41 (1986).
415. SeeAngela R. Riley, Good (Native) Governance, 107 COLUM. L. REV. 1049, 1072-74,
1103-07 (2007).
416. See LIE, supra note 48, at 237, 269-72.
417. See Charles Wilkinson, Listening to All the Voices, Old and New: The Evolution of
Land Ownership in the Modern West, 83 DENV. U. L. REV. 945, 952-58 (2006) (discussing
Mormon, Hispanic, and Indian cultural interests in western lands).
418. SeeHoldsworth, supra note 401, at 1003.
419. Cf Debra L. Donahue, Western Grazing: The Capture of Grass, Ground, and
Government, 35 ENrL. L. 721, 721 (2005) (critiquing federal policy promoting grazing on
public lands as founded on "beliefs . . . that public-land ranching is a culture worth
preserving").
420. See Lobato v. Taylor, 70 P.3d 1152 (Colo. 2003) (a case where "successors to
original settlers of a Mexican land grant sued a landowner who had fenced adjoining
mountain property, seeking rights of access for grazing, hunting, fishing, timbering,
firewood, and recreation"); See also Angela Garcia, Land of Disenchantment: A Native New
Mexican Digs for the Roots of a Tragic Epidemic, HIGH COUNTRY NEWS, 3-13, 19, April 3, 2006,
available at http://www.hen.org/servlets/hent.Article?articleid=16202# (tracing the
heroin epidemic "that is destroying the Hispano community of the Espanola Valley" in
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Christian churches have a long history of using the public lands for
religious services, camps and retreats.4 ' Practitioners of New Age
religions, such as the Rainbow Family, hold annual gatherings in
the national forests.422 And recent research has begun to reveal
special "historical, religious, and spiritual ties" between African
Americans and the national forests.423
Federal land management policy is not well-served by denying
the fact that sub-national groups have claims to the public lands. In
1916, Congress declared that the varied lands comprising the
national parks are "united . . . into one national park system as
cumulative expressions of a single national heritage . . . and
managed for the benefit and inspiration of all the people of the
United States."424 One could read this statute as referencing only
national and individual interests in the national parks. Yet, even if
it wasn't clear in 1916, it is quite clear today that the term "all
people" implicates a number of "peoples" whose interests in the
parks are collective. As Professor Burton has argued, the Lyng
standard "do [es] . . . a disservice to the evolution of constructive
legally pluralistic public policy" in the sacred sites arena.42
The property and peoplehood approach can help the land
management agencies confront the pluralistic realities facing
them. But it is important to mitigate potential conflict between
part to "land loss [which] is so much more than real estate: it is the loss of life and
traditions").
421. A recent Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) request initiated by the Native
American Rights Fund, for example, reveals that dating back to the 1950s the Forest
Service has granted over 350 special use permits to religious groups, primarily Christian
churches and camps. See Letter from the U.S. Forest Serv,. to Steven Moore, Native Am.
Rights Fund (2003) (on file with author).
422. See U.S. Forest Serv. & Bureau of Land Mgmt., Special Uses, Noncommercial
Group Uses Regulations Frequently Asked Questions, nos. 22-24 (2002), http://
www.fs.fed.us/recreation/permits/documents/ncgu-q-a-2002.doc. The Forest Service
allows the Rainbow Family, "a loosely knit association of persons who organize gatherings
in the national forests for their stated purpose to celebrate life, worship, express ideas and
values, and associate with others who share their beliefs" to use the national forests and
BLM lands for gatherings attracting "as many as 20,000 people from across the nation." Id.
at no.22.
423. Earl C. Leatherberry, An Overview of African Americans' Historical, Religious, and
Spiritual Ties to Forests, in PROCEEDINGS OF THE SOCIETY OF AMERICAN FORESTERS 1999
NATIONAL CONVENTION 452 (2000), available at http://ncrs.fs.fed.us/pubs/viewpub.asp?
key=2570.
424. 16 U.S.C. §§ la-1 (Westlaw 2008).
425. See BURTON, supra note 47, at 292.
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peoples. Several factors may help in this regard.426 First, individual
rights are still well-protected in public lands law. The
Establishment Clause works to ensure that accommodations of
sacred sites practice stop short of imposing American Indian
religious belief on other citizens.4 7 Moreover, the Equal Protection
and Due Process Clauses protect individual access and property
rights on the public lands.428
Moreover, effectuating a theory of property and peoplehood at
sacred sites has the potential to nurture "common ground" among
various users of the public lands.4 29 As suggested above, United
States citizens share a common interest in religious freedom and
may be able to coalesce around that aspect of sacred sites practice.
Secondly, Americans may be ready to address the historic
oppression of Indian religious and dispossession of Indian land.43 °
As a common resource, the 654 million acres of public lands are
well-suited for dispersing the costs (social, economic and
otherwise) of Indian needs.43' Finally, the Rawlsian notion of
"reciprocity" suggests that, as decent peoples, Indian tribes should
extend the same tolerance for non-Indian religion and property.432
Thus, a reformed sacred sites practice might foster a widespread
attitude of respect and cooperation among individuals and peoples
on the public lands.433
426. See, e.g., John Dendahl, Indian Sovereignty Has Outlived Its Usefulness, HAW. REP.,
Jan. 26, 2006, available at http://www.hawaiireporter.com/story.aspx?b052fb7c-bf08-4526-
8155-70caddl2dl5l (arguing Indian sacred sites claims threaten to divide American
citizens and lead to "national weakness" and "Balkanization").
427. See, e.g., Navajo Nation v. U.S. Forest Serv., 479 F.3d 1024, 1045 (9th Cir. 2007)
(evaluating whether refusal to allow snowmaking plan on San Francisco Peaks would
constitute Establishment Clause violation). See also Carpenter, supra note 46, at 1147
(arguing that accommodating Indian interests at sacred sites on federal public lands is
unlikely to violate the Establishment Clause because it almost always pursues a secular
purpose, does not have the primary effect of advancing religion, and does not entangle
the government in religion).
428. See James L. Huffman, The Inevitability of Private Rights in Public Lands, 65 U.
COLO. L. REv. 241, 270 & n.154 (1994).
429. See RONALD D. BRUNNER ET AL., FINDING COMMON GROUND: GOVERNANCE AND
NATURAL RESOURCES IN THE AMERICAN WEST 15 (2002) (setting out the notion of
"common interest" in natural resource governance).
430. Thomas E. Merrill & Henry E. Smith, The Morality of Property, 48 WM. & MARY L.
REv. 1849, 1876 (2007) (arguing that Americans generally favor Indian land reparations).
431. See Carpenter, supra note 46, at 1128-30 (considering a law and economics
justification for sacred sites accommodations).
432. See RAWLS, supra note 49, at 28-29.
433. See KLEIN ET AL., supra note 30, at 292-93 (describing "collaborative
[Vol. 27:313
2008] REAL PROPERTY AND PEOPLEHOOD
3. Non-fungibility as an administrative standard?
Finally, some critics may challenge the idea that Indian beliefs
about the non-fungibility of sacred sites should be used as a
normative management standard for the public lands. Indeed, this
standard is not found in any of the organic statutes creating the
agencies or, indeed, in any federal land management statute. The
idea of non-fungibility may be compatible with the Park Service's
"conservation" mandate, which calls for the protection of "scenery
and the natural and historic objects and the wild life ... by such
means as will leave them unimpaired for the enjoyment of future
generations.""4 4 But non-fungibility is less obviously compatible
with the Forest Service's "multiple-use" mandate, under which the
forests are to be managed "for outdoor recreation, range, timber,
watershed, and wildlife and fish purposes.""4 5 This directive seems
to treat the forests as generally fungible resources. 6
There are several possible responses to this critique. The first is
that, as cases like Bear Lodge, Wyoming Sawmills, Natural Arch, and
Navajo Nation make clear, the land use agencies are bound not
only by their organic statutes but also by the NHPA Paying close
management of federal natural resources"). In some respects my argument may fall prey
to a similar critique that scholars have mounted against Radin's work, namely its focus on
consensus over conflict. See, e.g., Stephen J. Schnably, Property and Pragmatism: A Critique of
Radin's Property and Personhood Theory, 45 STAN. L. REV. 346, 361-62 (1993). Because I am
writing in a context-the public lands-that requires some degree of compromise between
conflicting groups, I feel bound to work toward consensus and believe such an approach
offers Indians the best chance of meaningful sacred sites accommodations. In the final
analysis, however, I argue that if conflict is unavoidable, Indian claims should be
prioritized over competing claims that do not implicate non-fungible peoplehood
concerns.
434. National Park Organic Act, 16 U.S.C. § 1 (Westlaw 2008).
435. Multiple Use Sustained Yield Act of 1960, 16 U.S.C. § 528 (Westlaw 2008). See
also Federico Cheever, The United States Forest Service and National Park Service: Paradoxical
Mandates, Powerful Founders, and'the Rise and Fall of Agency Discretion, 74 DENV. U. L. REV.
625, 628 (1997) ("The Park Service and the Forest Service are different. The Forest Service
authorizes logging, oil and gas development, mining and hunting in the national forests.
The Park Service (with a few exceptions) permits none of these uses in National Parks.").
436. See IN THE LIGHT OF REVERENCE, supra note 326 ("Recreation is one of the top
five income generators in every western state. It's very, very important. But what we also see
is the potential that mining activity, oil and gas activity, or timber harvesting, or ranching
or water development, or these other activities that are very important economically, could
also be stopped as a result of, 'Well, somebody thinks it's sacred, and that's enough for
us."' (interview of William Perry Pendley)).
437. See also Muckleshoot Indian Tribe v. U.S. Forest Serv., 177 F.3d 800, 807-08 (9th
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attention to which public lands are, or aren't, fungible to
American Indians is one way that agencies can use their
considerable discretion to reconcile what may be conflicting
statutory mandates.41 8 The fungibility analysis may help agencies
prioritize among competing claims to the public lands where
organic statutes fail to provide substantive guidance.41 9 Finally,
Congress seems increasingly receptive to non-fungible concerns in
the modern era, and has amended the Forest Service mandates to
recognize a duty to implement "a natural resource conservation
posture that will meet the requirements of our people in
perpetuity.
440
Critics may also argue that a societal bias in favor of wealth-
maximization is not the only force that makes it difficult for
agencies to protect sacred sites. Indeed, agencies must mediate
political pressures of every conceivable nature. 44 Yet, my "non-
fungibility" approach seems narrowly tailored to counter market
arguments.
4 2
Cir. 1999) (enjoining proposed land exchange due in part to agency's failure to mitigate
effects as specified in NHPA regulations); see generally Melissa A. MacGill, Old Stuff Is Good
Stuff: Federal Agency Responsibilities Under Section 106 of the National Historic Preservation Act, 7
ADMIN. L.J. AM. U. 697 (1994).
438. See generally Martin Nie, Statutory Detail and Administrative Discretion in Public
Lands Governance: Arguments and Alternatives, 19J. ENVTL. L. & LITIG. 223 (2004).
439. Michael C. Blumm, Public Choice Theory and the Public Lands: Why "Multiple Use"
Failed, 18 HARv. ENVTL. L. REv. 405, 407 (1994) (arguing the multiple-use statutes amount
to a "standardless delegation of authority to managers of public lands"); see 63C AM. JUR.
2D Public Lands § 86 (2008) ("While 'multiple use' is defined, there is no indication as to
the weight to be assigned to each value, and the proper mix of uses within an area is left to
the discretion of the Forest Service.").
440. Forest Service Organic Act of 1897, as amended, 16 U.S.C. § 1600(6) (Westlaw
2008).
441. These include the historical tension between federal power and local control
over the public lands, competition among commodity-users of the public lands and the
problem of "agency capture" by various interest groups. See, e.g., Sandra K. Davis, Fighting
over Public Lands: Interest Groups, States, and the Federal Government, in WESTERN PUBLIC
LANDS AND ENVIRONMENTAL POLITICS (Charles Davis ed., 1997).
442. This Article does not address the extent to which non-fungibility succeeds as a
response to economic arguments on the public lands. Just briefly, I note that proponents
of a labor theory might argue that those who use the public lands for economic purposes
such as mining and ranching have a higher set of entitlements than American Indians who
seek to use them for "unproductive" purposes. This line of analysis echoes concerns that
the public lands represent a "tragedy of the commons" scenario in which the absence of
private property rights disincentivizes their productive use. See generally Amy Sinden, The
Tragedy of the Commons and the Myth of A Private Property Solution, 78 U. COLO. L. REV. 533
(2007). Of course the aim of my real property and peoplehood argument is to further the
idea that non-economic uses of the public lands are far from "tragic," that religious and
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My hope, however, is that considering the non-fungible quality
of certain places on the public lands to certain peoples will
resound with broader theories of federal land management.
Consider, for example, the "place-based" ethic of federal land
management.44 Rather than presenting a dichotomous choice
between commodity or conservation-driven uses of the public
lands generally, a place-based approach evaluates appropriate uses
of specific lands based on their natural features or other
qualities. 4 With their deep, intergenerational knowledge of the
landscape,445 American Indians can help land managers appreciate
the particular histories and environmental qualities of specific
places.446 In the Natural Arch case, for example, decades of tourism
had eroded the sandstone arch at Rainbow Bridge National
Monument, a sacred site to Navajos."' The Park Service eventually
adopted a management plan asking all visitors to adopt the Navajo
practice of not touching or walking under the arch."' The Park
Service believed this practice would be a useful tool in achieving
the conservation goals required by federal statute.
Non-Indians also have important perspectives on "place" that
should guide land use management decisions. Certain sites may be
non-fungible because they serve as habitats for endangered
species, monuments to national history, or settings for specialized
cultural uses are valuable in their own way, and that these uses should prevail at sacred
sites. Cf RUTHERFORD H. PLATr, LAND USE AND SOCIETY 5-6 (1996) (calling for attention
to cultural and other non-economic values that people attach to land).
443. See CHARLES F. WILKINSON, THE EAGLE BIRD: MAPPING A NEW WEST 137-38
(1992) ("We need to develop an ethic of place. An ethic of place respects equally the
people of a region and the land, animals, vegetation, water, and air."). Another approach
that may or may not be consistent with my peoplehood model-and that deserves
consideration in a subsequent work-is an ecology approach to federal land management.
See, e.g., Jamieson E. Colburn, Habitat and Humanity, Public Lands Law in the Age of Ecology,
29 ARIz. ST. L.J. 145 (2007). Thanks to Martin Nie for raising the "ecology" question.
444. See KLEIN ET AL., supra note 30, at 2-3; ERIC FREYFOGLE, THE LAND WE SHARE:
PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE COMMON GOOD 35 (2003).
445. See WILKINSON, supra note 417, at 960 ("The Indian world view holds the most
sophisticated connection between our species and the natural world of any body of
thought I know.").
446. MARY ANN GLENDON, RIGHTS TALK: THE IMPOVERISHMENT OF POLITICAL
DISCOURSE 176 (1991) ("We have much to learn from [N]ative Americans who have long
known that there is a way in which the land owns us, even as we pretend to own the land,
and that we ignore that fact at our own peril.").
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recreational endeavors.449  Public lands may deserve special
treatment because past uses have damaged the physical
environment or because a community's way of life depends on it.
Other lands may be ideal locations for extractive industries.
Explicit consideration of what makes a certain natural resource
non-fungible to various peoples is one component of a place-based
approach to public lands management. Such analysis can supply
meaningful content to abstract statutory land management
concepts like "conservation" and "multiple-use," and inspire more
thoughtful allocation of resources and uses on the public lands.
V. CONCLUSION
The opening paragraphs of this Article suggested that
American peoplehood is defined, in large part, by the individual
freedoms guaranteed to its citizens. Within the larger society,
American Indians have struggled to maintain their own
peoplehood, dependent as it is on their collective spiritual
relationship with traditional lands, for which the law has
inadequate protection. Historically, these tensions have seemed
intractable. Today, however, the resolution of Indian sacred sites
claims presents an opportunity for the peoplehood interests of
Americans and Indian tribes to converge over shared interests in
religious freedom and cultural pluralism.45 °
Beyond sacred sites, my theory of real property and
peoplehood requires that tribal interests in land be treated
seriously-at least as seriously as the property of individual citizens,
states, and the national government.4 51 Indeed, Indian claims
should often be given special deference in light of the inextricable
relationship between tribal peoples and their lands. Outside of
Federal Indian Law, other groups might be able to make their own
claims for special protection of real property.4 5' By legitimizing
449. Cf KLEIN ET AL., supra note 30, at 2-3 (describing the goal of place-based legal
frameworks to "integrate ecological, economic, and social factors to provide long-term
sustained protection of the environment").
450. See FELDMAN, supra note 45, at 3.
451. In a forthcoming article, I will critique Supreme Court jurisprudence that
denies tribal jurisdiction, takings, and sovereignty claims over reservation lands and call for
legal reform facilitating comprehensive recovery of the tribal land base. See Property and
Recovery (2008) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the author).
452. Such group claims are often made with respect to cultural property, see supra
note 195. Hopefully this Article will stimulate thinking on the ability of groups to bring
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such claims, we might foster a better understanding of all citizens'
relationship with the American landscape and begin to heal some
of the inequities instigated at our nation's founding. Perhaps in
these ways, the United States can make progress toward realizing
both the individual and collective freedoms that define our
American peoplehood.
claims to real property. See supra note 413 (on special ramifications of Supreme Court's
Kelo decision for African Americans affected by urban redevelopment); Mary L. Clark,
Treading on Hallowed Ground: Implications for Property Law and Critical Theory of Land
Associated with Human Death and Burial 94 KY. L.J. 487, 487-89 (2005) (considering Radin's
property and personhood theory as a basis for criticizing unequal treatment of "white" and
"non-white" burial sites).
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